



UNITED NATIONS  
MULTI-PARTNER  
TRUST FUND

Reconciliation Stabilization Resilience

Area Based Programming (ABP)  
**Greater Tonj,  
Warrap State**

IMPLEMENTING

AGENCY

**PROGRAMME DOCUMENT**

*Note: Please make sure to respond to the guidance prompts. No technical proposals over 30 pages will be accepted.*

RSRTF REFERENCE:	<i>To be completed by the Secretariat</i>		
GRANT ORGANISATION:	RECIPIENT	World Food Programme (WFP)	
PARTICIPATING ORGS.	<u>RECIPIENT</u>	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Peace Canal The Organisation for Children's Harmony (TOCH) Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)	
PROGRAMME TITLE:	<b>Kong Koc:</b> Laying the foundation for peaceful, stable, and resilient communities in greater Tonj		
LOCATION:	Greater Tonj area of Warrap State: Tonj South, Tonj North, and Tonj East counties		
RELEVANT OUTCOME(S):	RSRTF	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>REDUCED VIOLENCE:</b> Individuals, particularly children and women, are facing less violence at the community and local level.</li> <li>2. <b>INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:</b> Communities have effective mechanisms in place that meaningfully include women and youth to resolve and prevent conflicts peacefully.</li> <li>3. <b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; RULE OF LAW:</b> A strong and integrated justice chain offers lawful redress for victims and trust exists between citizens and state security apparatus, justice, and law enforcement institutions.</li> <li>4. <b>CIVIC PARTICIPATION &amp; GOVERNANCE:</b> Government is accountable, transparent, and responsive and citizens, including women, youth and disadvantaged groups, exercise their rights to meaningfully participate in public debate and civic engagement.</li> <li>5. <b>HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT:</b> Individuals, youth in particular, are empowered and incentivized to shift from violence and criminality as a means of economic survival to productive participation in socio-economic processes.</li> <li>6. <b>PEACE DIVIDENDS:</b> Reconciled communities enjoy socio-economic improvements that increase interdependency, social cohesion and self-reliance, and mitigate catalysts of violent resource-based competition.</li> </ol>	
UNCF PRIORITY AREA(S) THE PROGRAMME CONTRIBUTES TO:			
PLANNED DURATION:	PROGRAMME	2 years	START DATE: 15 August 2022 END DATE: 14 August 2024

PROGRAMME SUMMARY: (Max 300 wds)

Efforts to address conflict in Tonj over the last two decades have generally not adopted an intentional, sequenced, and community-led peacebuilding approach. Resolutions are often not implemented, with no visible peace dividends or mechanisms to contain new incidents. The suppression of norms of restraint (including *kong koc*) has removed safeguards from customary institutions, which is exacerbated by ongoing impunity. Peace attempts often lack resourcing and scope to cover the maximum geographic and social extent of prevailing conflict dynamics.

The project, which takes a phased approach, situates dialogues in Phase 1 (engagement phase) within a systematic process. Partners will engage those directly responsible for violence and work to strengthen community structures and practices for conflict management. The pivot from Phase 1 to Phase 2 (implementation phase), will be via a Greater Tonj conference which will articulate the negotiated position of all stakeholders, including key issues and proposed mechanisms for addressing them. Partners have identified broad programmatic parameters in this proposal based on initial analysis, but specifics will be decided and aligned with the inter-group agreement on priorities. In Phase 2, selected resilience and stabilization interventions will be implemented. In the complex dynamics of this programming, many opportunities will only emerge and develop as the program moves forward and therefore cannot be fully articulated in advance. A system that will make visible these opportunities (and, where relevant, risks) in a timely manner, with an equally timely mechanism to respond, is therefore central to this strategy.

Those responsible for initiating violence will be engaged across all pillars and youth (and women) associated with armed groups will be targeted for resilience and livelihoods programming. Partners will create forums for women to build confidence and formulate strategic approaches to influence male dominated spaces, while targeting women deliberately for resilience interventions as part of a longer-term gender transformative agenda.

PROGRAMME SIGNATURES

RECIPIENT ORGANISATION

Name:   
 Date: 08 Aug 2022

RSRTF STEERING COMMITTEE CHAIR

Name: Sara Bayolow Nyanti  
 Date: 10/08/2022


PROGRAMME MANAGER CONTACT DETAILS

MANAGING AGENT (if applicable):

Name: Samuel Dae  
 Date: 15-08-2022

FUND SECRETARIAT

Name:   
 Date: 08/08/2022



PROGRAMME BUDGET

CATEGORIES

AMOUNT

1. Staff and other personnel costs	\$1,093,118.00
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$2,206,049.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture including Depreciation	\$87,556.00
4. Contractual Services	\$2,103,500.00
5. Travel	\$933,020.00
6. Transfers and Grants Counterparts	\$4,963,637.00
7. General Operating and Other Direct Costs	\$102,566.00
Sub-Total Programme Costs	\$11,489,446.00

8. Indirect support costs	\$784,094.00
<b>PROGRAMME TOTAL</b>	<b>\$12,273,540.00</b>

### 1.CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

High levels of organised armed violence in greater Tonj (Warrap state) continue to have a negative impact on the political, social, and economic development of the region. Indeed, an increase in organised violence since 2020 has increased the scale, scope, and complexity of civilian needs in greater Tonj, resulting in hundreds of casualties, the displacement of tens of thousands of people, widespread loss of livestock, disruption to agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, and the destruction of civilian property and humanitarian and state facilities and assets.<sup>1</sup> In August 2021, communities in greater Tonj were also hit by a third round of unprecedented and devastating floods. The cumulative effects of conflict and floods has left all three counties (Tanj East, Tanj North, and Tanj South) facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity – with five to ten percent of the population projected to face Catastrophic (IPC Phase 5) levels of food insecurity throughout the 2021 lean season.

Although violence in greater Tonj may on the surface seem to be ‘cattle raids’, ‘revenge killings’, ‘land disputes’, or ‘inter-communal violence’, such descriptors capture only part of the forces at work. Violence in greater Tonj does not occur exclusively through individual revenge attacks or cattle raids, but through multiple forms and layers of violence with overlapping objectives. What are labelled as cattle raiding attacks are increasingly difficult to differentiate from other types of social and political violence and a deeper analysis illuminates striking subnational and national elements at play. In particular, the signing of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018 saw a shift in the logic of the violence, whereby rather than violence taking place largely between the government and opposition groups, violence now plays out predominantly at section, sub-section, or clan levels. As a result, the common narrative by many actors is that clashes and violence in greater Tonj are ‘communal’. Indeed, most violence continues to be passed off as the result of the ‘youth’ who are out of control, sub-ethnic grievances, or the result of scarcity of resources. It should be noted, however, that the intensification of sub-national violence among not only Dinka sub-ethnicities, but sections within the same sub-ethnicities in greater Tonj are rarely based on issues like perceived differences of identity or scarcity of resources. Where these elements exist, they must be considered in relation to existing politics, including dynamics of power and access. Indeed, political and military elites consistently exploit local rivalries in greater Tonj, manipulating historical divisions between communities and instrumentalising identities to marginalise or control populations presumed dissident to one actor or another. What appears to be inter-communal conflicts are therefore deeply connected to the politics of Juba.

Indeed, at the **national level**, elites from Warrap state, including greater Tonj, play an important role in the national government, particularly as President Salva Kiir has, since the signing of the Revitalised Peace Agreement in 2018, increasingly favoured those with close connections to his own Bahr el Ghazal community. The dominance of Warrap – and Tonj – elites in Juba’s ruling class has magnified the linkages between national actors and the communities they represent, generally assumed along kinship lines. While the Warrap elites are essential to the national regime’s survival, they simultaneously may pose a threat to it if they become too powerful. As such, since 2018, uncertainty surrounding the political longevity of different elites from greater Tonj has made bargaining between the Presidency and national and sub-national elites more complicated. The rise and fall of several military and political elites within the President’s circle in 2020 and 2021 played out violently in greater Tonj, particularly as those elites can leverage and mobilise their socio-economic networks for violent purposes. Indeed, the last few years have illustrated how the continuous bargaining for position and loyalty by national level elites, coupled with a shortening of political longevity, impacts conflict dynamics in greater Tonj as elites from the region continue jockeying for political supremacy at the subethnic level. Rivalries between national level security institutions – particularly the National Security Service (NSS) and the South Sudan Peoples Defense Force (SSPDF) – at times also played out violently in Tonj. According to several Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reports, NSS has since 2018 been arming members of local militias and recruiting a division-sized militia force in Tanj North, trained by and placed under the direct control and command of the NSS. Other local community-based militias have similarly been recruited to swell the ranks of military forces operating in Tanj.<sup>2</sup> 2020 saw rival security institutions engaged in a proxy conflict between NSS and the SSPDF’s Military Intelligence (MI), exacerbating local conflict dynamics. The 2020 disarmament exercise, led by MI was similarly largely directed at communities and sections loyal to the NSS:

At the **sub-national and local levels**, political agendas work in concert with, counter to, or alongside national agendas, interacting with violence in dynamic ways. Violence generally occurs as state and local elites seek to demonstrate their value to both national elites and grassroots constituencies and as they use their access to resources to pursue state and local objectives. In particular, the flagrant exploitation of impunity (as a non-rent form

<sup>1</sup> Human Rights Council, “Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan”, paras. 77 – 80, HRC Forty-ninth session.

<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Council, “Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan”, paras. 79, HRC Forty-ninth session.

of payment), both granted by the government and due to an inability of the government to enforce greater regulation and control, has created a highly permissive environment for sub-national and local violence. Rivalries over local appointments, and related access to resources, also fuel conflict. Notably, the recent spike in violence in greater Tonj coincided with the national transition from 32 to ten states. This transition led to a loss of administrative control, power, and access to rents for authorities at state, county, and payam levels, which exacerbated competition and rivalry for positions. This situation was further aggravated by the allocation of sub-state positions based on the R-ARCSS, according to which the SPLA-IO and SSOA received positions within areas largely supportive of the incumbent government. This also led to the further marginalisation of Tonj East communities (appointed to the SPLA-IO), which was already exemplified by the fact that none of the state-level ministerial portfolios were given to politicians from Tonj East. It should be noted here that sub-national and local political objectives do not always consistently align with national government objectives. Violence related to shifts in balances of power at the national level as well as related to disarmament campaigns, as was seen in August 2020, often do not align with national government objectives which focus primarily on regime survival. Nevertheless, attempts to repress activities that are counterproductive to national objectives are generally constrained by an inability of the government to halt episodes of violence due to a lack of capacity and the need to not disrupt the balance of power among sub-ethnic groups more than is necessary to sanction a given group. Furthermore, national repression that kills large numbers of youth is counterproductive in that it reduces the potential military capacity of the national government and loyal elites, and generates additional grievances, that are often used to justify further violence.

It should be noted that political objectives do not explain every instance of violence in greater Tonj. While national and subnational political objectives unquestionably underpin mobilisations for violence, grassroots objectives relating to perceived exclusion and threat of exclusion from key natural resources, like water and pasture, also drove violence in greater Tonj in the last few years. However, while organised violence in greater Tonj is often characterized as natural resource conflicts, the relationships between communities and key natural resources – like relative high ground, pastures, and water points – is highly dynamic and informed by both historical legacies and contemporary issues. In reality, it is rare that an absolute scarcity in resources leads to violence. It is more often the real or perceived exclusion and threat of exclusion from key resources that drives organised violence. Nevertheless, persisting (perceptions of) uneven physical, social, economic, and political access to natural resources, markets, governing institutions, and other forms of capital and opportunity continues to breed grievance and reduces the likelihood of durably resolving disputes non-violently.

Beyond the political objectives that underpin organised violence in greater Tonj, it is crucial to also understand the governance deficits in greater Tonj, the social, geographic, and temporal scope of organised violence, the capacity and political linkages of armed actors involved, as well as the forms and targeting of violence used.

- Governance deficits:** While the political economies of violence described above are crucial for understanding conflict dynamics, weak national, sub-national, and local governance has also contributed significantly. In a context characterized by an almost complete lack of services, functional governance institutions, and downward accountability, communities increasingly view ethnic- or clan-based identities as the only way to ensure access to resources and physical security. The government's inability to address security issues at the local level not only causes further violence, but attempts at disarmament, including uncertainty about the disarmament exercise which is set to start imminently, then become existential threats, particularly when viewed in relation with other mechanisms of politically motivated marginalisation used by elites to disadvantage rival communities or actors. Further, the lack of judicial rule of law infrastructure and capacity, including judges, and prosecutors, police and corrections, throughout greater Tonj enables perpetrators to commit violence and serious crimes with impunity. Security forces, such as police, also have only a very thin presence of security forces, especially in Tonj East. With almost no access to justice, communities respond to serious crimes through retaliation, exacerbating cycles of revenge attacks.
- Social scope:** In greater Tonj, sub-ethnic violence was largely reduced during the 2013-18 civil war, during which time some of the border regions between Warrap and Unity and Western Bahr el Ghazal had effectively become frontlines between the government and the opposition. Post-2018, historical tensions between communities regained importance, as elites instrumentalised such tensions to effectively push factional divisions within Kiir's regime. The protracted violence since then has led to sub-ethnic fragmentation the breaking of historical alliances (as existed between the Loupaher from Marial Lou and the Luacjang from Tonj east) and formation of new alliances. Intra-sectional violence has also been on the rise, as seen for instance in the alliance formed by the Leer Ajak clan (Kirrik) of the Kuac'hii sub-section with other sub-sections (including the Awan Parek of Rualbet) against other Kuac'hii clans (*for a breakdown of sections, sub-sections, and clans, see Annex E*). The deterioration of relations and resulting trust deficits have led to movement restrictions and the weakening of kinship networks and the reliability and extent of support between kin, which has had disastrous effects on communities' ability to cope and adapt during crises. Furthermore, the mechanism of revenge, which previously functioned as a constraint on violence among lower social groups, has escalated beyond its traditional role. Historically, revenge violence was

used to prevent escalation and encourage expeditious conflict resolution within and between individual sub-sections and sections. The credible threat of successful violent retaliation proportional to the original grievance and the risk of escalation to larger social groups with greater capacity for violence limited revenge cycles in the absence of any authority capable of enforcing the rule of law. Presently, however, the institution of revenge has escalated beyond the traditional mechanism of distinct and proportional attacks and has morphed into a broader range of ostensibly unrestrained targeted killings and targeting of entire communities. As such, the conflict seen currently among sections and sub-sections in greater Tonj appear as an inversion of traditional norms of revenge: where violence was most actively restrained among lower social groups in the past, it now appears to be most intense among sections, sub-sections, and clans. Understanding changes in the social scope of violence also helps to understand the immediate impact of the violence as there are clear links between the effectiveness of economic predation through violence – the stripping of productive assets, including livestock, from civilian populations – and the physical and social distance between the social groups from which perpetrators and target are from. Indeed, the minimal to negligible social and physical distance between perpetrators and targets within the ongoing violence in greater Tonj (i.e., violence playing out mostly at section and sub-section levels) has played a substantial role in the creation of famine conditions in these areas since 2020.

- Geographic scope:** In greater Tonj, persistent organised violence has created a situation of general insecurity which repeatedly forced communities to choose between their physical security and their livelihoods and seasonal food opportunities, with far reaching consequences for household and community resilience. Situated largely in the western floodplain, with the southern part of Tonj South on the ironstone plateau, households in greater Tonj rely primarily on livestock, in combination with seasonal agriculture and fishing. As elsewhere on South Sudan's flood plains, mobility is key to survival in this livelihood zone and any restrictions on freedom of movement – especially due to organised violence – can quickly have disastrous humanitarian implications. While climatic shocks like the last three years of floods also have an impact, it is when insecurity or floods keeps people or cattle from moving that periods of unusually acute hunger often occur.<sup>3</sup> Importantly, it is not just actual violence that impacts food security. The credible threat of violence, even in periods of relative security – including persistent rumours and reports of the imminent resumption of forcible disarmament – also leads to self-limiting behaviour, such as foregoing travel to agricultural land or areas for wild foods and firewood collection, hunting, and fishing. Furthermore, the greater Tonj context is influenced by the cross-border relations with Unity, Lakes, and Western Bahr el Ghazal. Cross-border incidents with Unity usually involves Nuer cattle keepers from Koch and Mayom (Tonj North) and Mayendit (Tonj East). During the dry-season, cross-border incidents usually increase as migration routes intersect and access to resources become more constrained, increasing regional instability along the borders. As seen during the intense bouts of violence in 2020 and 2021, such violence can rapidly escalate to involve different armed groups – including the SSPDF, Sudan Peoples Liberation Army-in Opposition (SPLA-IO), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), and the South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A) – and there is a high potential for the number of social groups involved to also quickly escalate. Since 2015, the southern borders of greater Tonj have also seen persistent violence stemming from divisions within and between the Dinka Rek and Dinka Luacjang of Tonj South and East and the Dinka Gok (of Cuiebet in Lakes, particularly the Akony and Panyar sections) and Dinka Agar (of Rumbek North, particularly the Pakam). The situation is furthermore exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between the Luo of Jur River (Western Bahr el Ghazal) and Dinka cattle keepers from Warrap. Of particular concern is also the presence of SPLA-IO in Jur River. Any violence between Dinka from Warrap and Luo from Jur River can easily escalate to involve SSPDF and Opposition elements on either side.
- Temporal scope:** The impact of general insecurity and persistent threats of violence on food security in greater Tonj is also strongly influenced by seasonality. Different seasons – rainy or dry – are more conducive to different strategies, tactics, and forms of violence. For instance, the denial of access to vital dry season water and grazing land by communities in conflict with those seeking access can have far-reaching consequences for pastoral livelihoods, including livestock health, milk production, and reproduction. The effective besiegement of the Dinka Luacjang community in Tonj East in 2021 by surrounding communities, for instance, prevented Luacjang cattle keepers from using traditional migration routes which take them from Paliang via Palai to the *toch* (swamps) of Manyangok, where their cattle access water. Instead, this year herds were driven into *toch* areas in Makuach and Pagor which were historically avoided due to the prevalence of livestock diseases and susceptibility to raids by Nuer from Mayendit (Unity). As a result, communities have reported an increase in livestock diseases, as well as the inaccessibility of humanitarian assistance in Paliang due to distance. The besiegement, in turn, contributed to further Luacjang raids into neighbouring communities to obtain food, livestock, and other assets, resulting in additional violence and spill over into northern Lakes. Rain-fed agriculture, on the other hand, is most affected if violence delays or

<sup>3</sup> IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, October 2020 – July 2021, Issued 18 December 2020, pp. 15 and 16.

prevents planting and other activities like weeding. Indeed, the spike in violence between May and June 2020 and again in 2021 prevented many communities in greater Tonj to plant which, coupled with the floods affecting the harvest of crops that had been planted, produced high levels of food insecurity in the region, even in areas which have not faced much insecurity since then. While most communities hope to plant during the 2022 planting season, it is highly likely that this year will see a similar spike in violence as attacks are generally deliberately planned to coincide with this season to have maximum impact. Furthermore, the upcoming rainy season and regrowth of vegetation, coupled with the reconfiguration and consolidation of cattle camps as the seasons transition, will be highly conducive to increased raiding activities by small groups as the vegetation reduces visibility.

- Armed actors involved:** As elsewhere in South Sudan, the severity of organised violence is impacted by the types of armed actors involved, and generally worsened by the presence and involvement of government forces. A variety of armed actors are involved in ongoing cycles of organised violence in greater Tonj, ranging from *gelweg* cattle keepers and community-embedded militias and self-defence groups to government security forces and co-ethnic militia forces outside formal or government structures. The level of organisation and military capability of actors involved varies widely, from small raiding groups organised for a single raid to professionalised militias supported by national security services. As noted above, the cross-border dimensions of violence in Tonj also risks bringing opposition groups into the tensions, despite decreasing tensions in the last two years. Finally, the differential and partisan involvement of different security actors – including NSS and the SSPDF – in disarmament and “conflict reduction” exercises over the last few years have seen several communities, some inadvertently, forced to establish new partnerships in order to better guarantee their own security, access to land and resources, and ability to effectively manage uncertainty in the context of attempted and imminent disarmament campaigns.
- Forms and targeting used:** Much of the violence in greater Tonj since 2018 represents a break from pre-1983 norms of violence, particularly in the number of deaths, the weaponry used, the level of organisation of groups involved, and linkages to various levels of political and economic elites and objectives. Much of this break is the consequence of actions taken during the second civil war (1983-2005) by armed actors to rapidly mobilize and deploy youth (*gelweg*) from greater Bahr el Ghazal. In particular, as politico-military elites continue to support, arm, and mobilise the *gelweg* from their home communities, the boundaries between militarised violence and ‘traditional’ raiding violence remain blurred. This is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, including machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which has allowed for the impact of violence to escalate beyond what traditional weaponry and norms previously allowed. Shifts in targeting are also visible. The latest period of violence has been marked by an increase in intensity and frequency of attacks and a shift in targeting tactics: in addition to looting cattle, attackers target entire villages, killing not only men of fighting age but also women, children, and the elderly, who had previously been spared in conflicts, and destroying their homes. Attackers also target state and humanitarian facilities such as schools, rub halls, and medical clinics, prioritizing causing damage to community and humanitarian assets over raiding cattle. Humanitarian actors have also been repeatedly ambushed and looted in Tonj East and Tonj North by armed elements seeking to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid to a community with which they are in conflict.

## 2. PROBLEM ANALYSIS:

While there have been dozens of peace dialogues in Warrap over the last two decades, these processes have often been led and designed by external actors, including government, UN, and NGOs, and have often been largely reactive, ad hoc, and not based on communities’ own analysis or recommendations for change. Such dialogues and conferences have at times been largely events in themselves and have not been embedded within an intentional, sequenced peacebuilding process based on community given recommendations. Decisions on who to include in the dialogue at times also lack strategic sequencing of engagement of different actors and stakeholders. Another challenge in previous attempts at peacebuilding has been the inability, due to a lack of resources or political will, to implement the resolutions coming out of dialogues and conferences.

This project will situate dialogues within a systematic process with clear accountability mechanisms, while simultaneously addressing historical memory as a structured way of dealing with the past. Project partners will engage those directly responsible for initiating violence while also working with and strengthening community structures and practices and prioritising traditional conflict management mechanisms at the community level. The project is also designed to preserve community ownership, while maintaining an authorising environment through engagement with government and relevant elites. Finally, the project is structured in such a way as to ensure that peace dividends are visible and concrete and material implementation of agreements is reached, including with sub-national government actors being supported to enforce agreements in a manner which upholds conflict sensitivity.

Any attempt to bring about meaningful change will require comprehensive interventions that go well beyond intra/inter-communal dialogue. Community driven security solutions, reconciliation, justice, and long-term community developments and livelihoods investments, as well as the inclusion of women, youth, and other marginalised groups is necessary for any peace to hold. Indeed, many local peace agreements are established with communities as the negotiating entity, such as through elders, local authorities, and other community representatives. In practice, however, many agreements fail because of the actions of small groups or individuals in a community, with the effect of bringing the wider community back into a conflict. The theft of one cow or a single incident of sexual violence, for example, can send entire communities back into conflict. Within lineage systems (i.e. Dinka sectional systems), the risk of escalation increases exponentially. To maintain space for dialogue, negotiation, and conflict resolution, new catalytic incidents must therefore be avoided or quickly contained. This may be achieved through a combination of increased accountability mechanisms, enhanced state and local governance, enhanced security solutions that are cognizant of and respond to the identified needs of the communities, and long-term community development. Furthermore, by acknowledging that sub-national peacebuilding is inherently a security issue of strategic importance, and therefore it needs a security guarantee, this project recognises the need to work with youths directly involved in the violence, as well as security actors and arms bearers at all levels. Thereby, this project is designed to result in the provision of security as well as the management of individuals and dynamics with potential to destabilise any progress made towards peace.

Moreover, another gap which this project seeks to address is the erosion and suppression of norms of restraint over many years of armed conflict and deprivation, removing the safeguards from customary institutions that previously served to strictly limit violence. Traditionally, customary authorities in greater Tonj played an important role in governing raiding behaviour, wielding significant power to initiate raids but also, to sanction and prevent them, and importantly to determine the forms and targeting of violence used. Western Dinka customary law includes norms distinction and proportionality that historically mitigated the impact of violence. These range from the traditional sacredness of livestock infrastructure to delivering advance warning of intended raids to allow for the evacuation of non-fighters from a targeted settlement or cattle camp. Other important traditional elements of restraint include spiritual practices related to the use of violence, such as purification, absolution, reconciliation, the condoning or sanctioning of acts of violence, and the principle of *kong koc* (literally translated as "first, wait"), used in contexts where an appeal to stay the hand of violence is made in situation where the desire for retribution is a driving force for mobilization. However, decades of militarised conflict have fundamentally changed societal roles and the nature of traditional authority. This trend has been exacerbated by the fact that members of *gelweng group*, as well as the *majokwuts* (cattle camp leaders or *gelweng* leaders), have become increasingly younger, which has further strained relationships between armed youth and elders and traditional authorities, despite historically having close, symbiotic relationships. Whereas traditional authorities continue to navigate the space between state institutions and their respective communities, the fluidity and contentious nature of their negotiated space increasingly requires them to seek powerful political and/or military connections to secure protection, resources, and rights, compromising the community's perception of their loyalty and independence. Whilst it is often said that shifts in targeting and forms of violence are a result of the erosion of traditional normative safeguards around violence by decades of war and the proliferation of arms, many such safeguards in fact endure. Indeed, rather than traditional authority and norms of restraint having been eroded or eliminated, it is their suppression or co-optation by elites that have led to new and intensified forms of violence. Nevertheless, the effects of different elements of restraint have become much reduced. This project seeks to restore and strengthen existing norms of restraint as well as other (customary) sources of civil, social, and spiritual power and authority to allow (former) fighters a way back into their own moral communities after having participated in organised violence as well as to limit and prevent future cycles of organised violence.

Furthermore, this project recognises that impunity for violence, raiding, and looting is a driver of conflict itself and often used as a non-rent form of resource transfer used by local and state elites who seek to demonstrate their value to grassroots constituencies. Indeed, the flagrant exploitation of impunity, both granted by the government and due to the lack of judicial and policing capacity and an inability of the government to enforce greater regulation and control, has created a highly permissive environment for sub-national and local violence. The lack of judicial rule of law infrastructure and capacity, including judges, and prosecutors, police, and corrections, throughout greater Tonj enables perpetrators to commit violence and serious crimes with impunity. Only one county court judge is currently assigned to greater Tonj. While attempts have been made to install more judges, very few are willing to be stationed in this region due to past attacks and the continued threat of violence against them. For instance, in 2020, the high court judge stationed in Tonj Town was chased out of the region by national disarmament forces who were unhappy with his rulings. Tonj East also lacks a prosecutor, as well as generally lacking rule of law infrastructure to facilitate the presence of justice chain actors. Security forces, such as police, also have only a very thin presence of security forces, especially in Tonj East County. With almost no access to justice, communities respond to serious crimes through retaliation, leading to cycles of revenge attacks. However, recent peace dialogues have demonstrated that communities in greater Tonj are seeking to stop such cyclical violence, including through calls from communities for individuals who have committed serious crimes to be held accountable. As such, this project will support grassroots driven solutions to strengthen accountability, conduct coordinated community monitoring, and peacefully resolve

disputes. The project also aims to build the confidence of conflict-affected population groups by developing rule of law infrastructure and capacity, developing rapid response mechanisms to address outbreaks of violence, and increasing legal awareness and empowering communities to make informed decisions on how to seek redress for disputes and enforce their rights through traditional and formal justice mechanisms. Rapid response mechanisms will be designed intentionally in response to short and medium-term accountability mechanisms requested by communities in the Tonj North and Tonj East Peace Conferences. The specifics of this mechanism will be further refined through community consultations in Phase I and will be informed by past UNMISS and UNDP experiences in supporting deployments of special, mobile, military, customary and circuit type courts. Programme partners will also engage with rule of law actors at the state and national level to identify and train police and prosecutors and support them to rapidly deploy to an area in order to quickly stabilise the situation. This training/capacity building will be complemented by the targeted infrastructure to be delivered under the programme, which will enable the sustained presence of all actors of the rule of law chain, thus hastening the response time for ensuring accountability. Continuous political engagement at the local, state, and national level will also endeavour to encourage increased investment by the government in traditional and statutory rule of law institutions and accountability mechanisms, which will ensure sustainability of the interventions.

Additionally, this project will ensure that activities, particularly those around reconciliation, social cohesion and strengthened accountability, will provide material gains in addition to intangible benefits. Indeed, without sustained livelihoods recovery, complemented with improved mobility for all communities, no meaningful peace can be achieved. Project partners will increase their risk tolerance by focusing resilience and development programming in areas prone to violence to support communities rebuild their asset base which has been severely impacted by conflict and climate shocks in the last few years, and provide new livelihood opportunities. Furthermore, as described above, mobility is key to survival across the western flood plains. Organised violence and the threat of it constrains mobility and thereby impedes livelihoods and creates or exacerbates food insecurity and economic deprivation. As such, this project will prioritize the creation of asset which can preserve or enhance mobility (including assets focused on a community's ability to control water flow and assets for the benefit of pastoralist communities) which will allow communities to take advantage of seasonal food opportunities and market access, support pastoralist livelihoods, and establish and improve connections within and between communities.

Finally, Dinka society in greater Tonj is roughly based on a hierarchy of patriarchal, lineage-based social units that may act corporately or independently depending on the situation. To varying degrees across space, time, and communities, these social structures promote the fission and fusion of constituent social groups in relation to the social level at which violence is attributed by and to the communities involved. Many local and external peacebuilding efforts in greater Tonj have failed because they lack the resourcing and scope to cover the maximum geographic and social extent of a given situation of violence, often focusing only on the social groups immediately engaged in the use of organised violence. Even when external interventions have successfully supported communities in moving towards peace to some degree, local successes often do not add up to peace at a higher societal, political, and institutional level. This gap is of particular concern during the Transitional Period, as ongoing political competition has compounded the already weak and/or absent formal governance mechanisms at the state level. This project seeks to address this gap by targeting a wide as possible geographic and social scope, with interventions designed to take a networked approach and ensuring that community level engagement is complemented by state and national engagement in a coordinated manner. Indeed, coordination within conflict systems is one of the key areas that the RSRTF programming across the country has been seeking to strengthen. Coordination and channels of communication between conflict systems is a less developed aspect. This is one reason for the partnership between TOCH, Peace Canal and CAD around the Reconciliation pillar, with each having experience in adjacent conflict systems. A wider actor mapping during inception will help identify further strategic cross-border partners. The inception phase will also allow for the development and setting up of appropriate communication and coordination mechanisms, including state and county authorities and peace, development, and humanitarian partners working in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, and Unity.

It is clear that the multi-layered and complex dynamics which underpin ongoing violence in Tonj require a combination of (a) effective reconciliation approaches on affected communities' own terms, focused on relational foundations of peace; (b) integration with material dividends (resilience) and strengthening institutional frameworks (stabilisation); and (c) effective mitigation (rather than elimination) of persistent conflict issues. As such, the RSRTF framework and methodology offers the most appropriate approach towards ensuring the development of a robust system for delivering effective outcomes.

### 3. GENDER ANALYSIS & GENDER MAINSTREAMING:

Women and girls in greater Tonj are often victims of the multi-layered violence described above, including through direct targeting and incidents of sexual and/or gender-based violence. At the same time, women and girls may at times promote norms of violence in accordance with traditional expectations of male behaviour, as has been



highlighted in recent peace dialogues. The violence witnessed in greater Tonj has also changed the traditional role of women, who were previously considered to be peacemakers, particularly within reconciliation ceremonies and as part of intermarriages, which historically could support better cohesion between conflict communities. Such marriages have lately largely been halted due to animosity between conflicting sections. In the last few years women have also been involved in the physical violence itself at times, including in targeted attacks as were seen in October 2021 when a Thiik woman killed a Luachang *majokwut*. Women furthermore continue to utilise their societal role in generating honour and shame to offer incentives and disincentives for a range of behaviours related to violence.

As an economically disenfranchised group, women are frequently unable to make positive, independent choices that would allow them the autonomy to challenge pernicious norms of violence. Boys and young men are equally at risk, not only of experiencing violence, but of inflicting it against their will to avoid social ostracization. Young men who seek to avoid participating in mobilization for violent activities may themselves be threatened and/or assaulted to ensure compliance with leading norms of violence. For this reason, the project has identified reducing the marginalisation of youth and women and supporting norms of non-violence and restraint as key strategic objectives, and young women and men will be given priority as facilitators of community consensus-building processes.

Whilst the project's reconciliation activities prioritise and value the roles of traditional, spiritual, and religious leaders, it is recognised that women are culturally not given a central leadership role in the traditional structures. And whilst the traditional structures can resolve conflict issues if empowered to do so, the remedies can perpetuate structural violence against women, particularly when the issues relate to resolving cases of forced marriage, elopement, and gender-based violence. The process of integrating women's voices meaningfully into the traditionally male-dominated structures is likely to be slow and incremental. However, this is not the only strategy. Based on the suggestions of the women themselves, and the emerging effectiveness of women-led initiatives, partners will work to create separate forums for women to build confidence and formulate strategic approaches to influencing male dominated spaces. When these women's spaces are accompanied with connecting points into male-dominated spaces, considerable progress can be made, even whilst the visible structures remain ostensibly male-dominated. That such approaches can work in greater Tonj was borne out in 2021 when TOCH supported the Dotbaai Women Initiative (DOWI) to lead a month of pre-dialogues in four payams of Tonj North where they were able to reach armed youths in cattle camps that had thus far not accepted external interference from other peacebuilding initiatives. Indeed, the women were far more likely to break existing deadlocks as non-participants in the violence and were perceived to be more neutral. The feedback from the pre-dialogues fed into a larger conference between all payams, where the armed youth indicated that they had felt their initial grievances and concerns were heard.

Furthermore, during consultations, efforts will be made to identify local customary norms and practices reinforcing discrimination against traditionally disenfranchised groups such as women and youth. The project will endeavour to harness entry points to strengthen confluences between customary systems and national and human rights frameworks and to advocate for changes to address harmful customary and community-based practices. Furthermore, through enhanced accountability mechanisms for serious crimes, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), the project will enhance women and girl's access to justice and deter future violence against women and girls, which are often manifestations of harmful patriarchal gender norms underpinning conflict.

Finally, a WFP commissioned Gender Contextual Analysis for South Sudan highlights the value-centric organisation of communities, including in Warrap, that perpetuate the cycle of economic and cultural valuation (or devaluation) of certain individuals and groups over others, thus shaping the rigid gender hierarchy. Cultural value placed on men leads to greater access and control over high-value key resources, and in turn higher valuation of their work, higher incomes, and greater visibility and representation in the public space. In contrast, women are assigned a lower cultural value that relegates them to the private, domestic space and work that is 'invisible' to societies, policy makers and implementers. In fragile contexts, such as that in greater Tonj, the transformation agenda for achieving the interconnected goals of gender equality, women's economic empowerment, and enhancing resilience should begin with gender-accommodating interventions, while gradually introducing gender-transformative inputs and ideas to communities. At this point in time, gender accommodating resilience programming in Tonj can promote women's spheres of empowerment, particularly in subsistence agriculture or pastoralism: food production, processing, provisioning, and nutrition. Here women have influence, visibility, access, and control – important entry points for assessing and monitoring whether or not harmful gender norms are reinforced or worsened; whether or not new forms of inequities are created; and thus 'who' represents, influences, and is valued in the community.

#### 4. YOUTH INCLUSION AND MAINSTREAMING


The 2020 and 2021 cycles of violence, including the 2020 disarmament process, have illuminated the increasingly fractious relationship between groups of armed pastoralists, often referred to as "armed youth", and the government, which has historically been quite fluid. Historically, armed pastoralist youth have had varying relationships with the SPLM/A (or SSPDF), at times blurring government–non-government boundaries. With the rise in violence from raids and attacks from northern Sudan in the late 1980s, *gelweg* groups were formed in greater Bahr el Ghazal, with

support from the quasi-government of the SPLA. By 1995, the SPLA were using the *gelweng* as an informal paramilitary force, carrying weapons and equipment, and providing a large, mobile reserve of fighters. Furthermore, as the Sudan Civil War transformed into increasing intra-south violence, particularly after Riek Machar's split from John Garang's SPLA in 1991, this trend led to the proliferation of ethnically based informal armies that were partially but never fully incorporated into military structures of the SPLA. Similarly, the 2013 outbreak of violence again saw *gelweng* armed and mobilised to fight for the government. *Gelweng* from greater Bahr el Ghazal played a significant role in supporting the government's military efforts against the SPLA-IO across South Sudan. Post-2018, the government, as well as the international community, has largely ignored the *gelweng*'s previous relationship to the SPLA/SSPDF and has reimagined them as uncontrolled, armed, cattle-keeping youth at a distance from the government and armed forces. Yet, the *gelweng* have maintained legitimacy locally and individual elites often continue to support, arm, and mobilise the *gelweng* of their own community. Politico-military elites from Tonj also continue to use private wealth to build co-ethnic armed youth networks through patronage, including through the giving and lending of cattle, and using *gelweng* to protect their personal herds. Locally, county and payam-level officials also continue appeal to the *gelweng* for support to ensure security in their administrative areas and chiefs actively nurture relationships with these youth.

It should be recognised, therefore, that male youth retain considerable agency regarding the use of violence despite their differential exploitation within organised violence across all layers: national, sub-national, and local. At the same time, male youth may reject the political objectives of violence for which they are mobilised in favour of their own in the use of violence. In particular, the motives for use of violence for pastoralist youth are rarely (purely) political, and rather revolve around ambitions of young men frustrated by their inability to influence political structures that exclude them. Material reward and the prospect of increasing personal livestock herds also influence decisions around the use of violence. While arguments about cattle raiding being exclusively about bride wealth are reductionist, increasing personal herds can ensure that young men are able to marry and transition into adult and manhood and be seen as full members of society. Young men, in that sense, do not just aspire for income and livelihoods, but for the social belonging that comes with being seen as adults in their communities.

Since young men are often the perpetrators of violence (as well as its victims), their interest and participation will be critical for the success of the project and they will be targeted for participation in as many ways as possible, including in dialogues, community-based participatory processes, livelihoods interventions, and stabilization interventions like non-armed community policing.

#### 4. THEORY OF CHANGE:



5. INTERVENTION STRATEGY:

A. Pillar Strategies

**Reconciliation (Peace Canal, TOCH, Civil Affairs Division)**

The overarching objective of the reconciliation pillar is to ~~strengthen community-level peace infrastructure to manage conflict related issues~~, by pursuing an iterative and cumulative process of community engagement, dialogues and inter-connected follow-up activities. The strategy is oriented towards a system that addresses four dimensions: prevention, warning, response and rebuilding. Dialogues as one-off events are ineffectual and can be counter-productive. When situated in a system of dialogues at multiple levels, they can create the channels and frameworks for inputs around these four dimensions. To establish this system, the program will be divided into two main phases.

**Phase 0** (see detailed explanation of phases under *Intervention Strategy*, below), is focused on obtaining an **authorising environment** and ensuring an in-depth understanding of processes, outcomes, and lessons learned from previous and ongoing interventions through three inception workshops and forty focus group discussions, and one workshop for consortium members to share and discuss the results of grassroots engagement. Phase 0 will allow partners to map existing community capacity to respond to conflict, including existing community-led conflict reduction and governance structures to develop a well-tailored peacebuilding approach. Phase 0 will also be used to form a community-led project oversight team that will work to support the implementation of this project to ensure

two-way accountability and to encourage community ownership. This mechanism will be established based on consultations with the community and an expectation setting exercise, which will help clarify and ensure that the mechanism set up is a feasible and effective system for achieving the objective of two-way transparency and clarity. As with other elements that rely on community consultation to design, we will not pre-empt the form but the principles will be based on transparency, frequency of review, and transparency of that process for the community, government and the RSRTF itself.

**Phase 1 is focused on the relational and analytical foundations for a successful peacebuilding agenda.** The strategy will focus on community engagement for the first months, aiming both at clarifying the analysis and, as importantly, building the trust with communities, developing relationships with particularly trusted allies, and creating relationships between those community leaders who are ready to accept responsibility for an *active, sustained* role throughout the programme. Many of the dialogues to date contain impressive resolutions, but many of which have not been implemented. This community engagement process will need also to re-build community trust in the potential for a dialogue process that has credible mechanisms for implementation, a credible narrative of why those have failed in the past, and an equally credible theory of how they will be implemented within the overarching three-pillar RSRTF approach. If the approach is to be driven by the community leadership, the belief in the theory of change needs to be owned, and genuine ownership will take time to establish. As well as rolling informal community engagement, the first phase will also include a series of pre-dialogues within critical interest groups that will support the clarification of interests and objectives as part of a larger inter-group dialogue. The project foresees forty pre-dialogues with all sub-sections in greater Tonj, three county-level conferences, and one final conference for greater Tonj. Based on lessons learned in other contexts, traditional ritual performances will be included in the conferences to mark the coming together of all the conflict stakeholders. A start-stop approach will be utilised to review lessons learned from every dialogue and conference and to factor in to continued study and learning of the process.

**The transition from phase one to two, and in effect the launch of Phase 2, will be via the Larger Greater Tonj Conference** that will articulate in consolidated form the negotiated position of the different interest groups, including the international community. It will identify the issues and the proposed mechanisms for addressing them. The result of this will be an implementation matrix that will be the collective accountability document for the communities and the RSRTF partners. This will require that RSRTF partners, whilst setting broad programmatic parameters based on initial analysis, reserve judgment on specifics to ensure that it is aligned with the inter-group agreement on priorities. An output of the conference will also be the community governance structures that will support the implementation of the agreements. Reconciliation partners will conduct a number of post-conference activities to ensure continuity, including 1) disseminating the resolutions throughout greater Tonj, including hard to reach areas via publications, meetings, and radio talk shows; 2) continuously build the capacity of the community-led oversight team; and advocate for further resource mobilisation for the implementation of resolutions that cannot be supported through existing funding streams; and 3) support the creation of inter-communal connectors, including through the support of common markets, cultural exhibitions, and sports events. In principle, the project also foresees a follow-up conference to reflect on the progress achieved, emerging challenges, and remaining gaps. However, this will be clarified through the process. The principles that will be observed are around ongoing stakeholder engagement, learning and iteration.

Nevertheless, in Phase 1, the reconciliation programming moves from a *central* role to a *supportive* role behind the material peace dividend work of the resilience and stabilisation pillars. The ongoing dialogue work, primarily now through the community structures the conference will identify, will be able to support sense-checks, conflict sensitivity, informal feedback and possible pivots around the resilience pillar. Resilience activities will also be supplemented by more transversal psycho-social, 'dealing with the past' support programming. It will also look for specific peacebuilding opportunities that could enhance or connect elements of the resilience programming as it unfolds. The stabilisation programming will bring technical expertise and frameworks to the context. The precise form of the community governance mechanisms will emerge through the process. It will also benefit from the lessons of Jonglei and other contexts. To clarify the relevance for the context, we will need to present those experiences to the communities and engage them in a discussion as to how those experiences can inform their own approach, reproduce the benefits and minimise the pitfalls.

**The governance mechanisms that result will be resourced**, albeit modestly; failure to do so has been a key source of inaction of equivalents in other programs. Communities must own peace, and the RSRTF must also recognise that engagement in peace coordination and governance is of economic value. Far from being a distortion of the local economy, it is more of a nudge that allows communities to correct the market distortions created by conflict. Where these incentives become problematic is where they are not accompanied with a genuine ownership of the process and thereby remain crude, albeit understandable rent-seeking. This is why the reconciliation pillar approach stands or falls on the extent to which it elicits this community ownership.

It is important likewise to acknowledge that peacebuilding is not a linear process and conflict will likely arise at different points during the process. This emergent community level peace infrastructure will significantly mitigate the risks of further conflict incidents derailing the wider process. This mitigation dimension has two key elements to it:

**Warning** – Operating according to a robust system of information validation, management and sharing so that clear and credible reporting is in place to capture early signs of escalating conflict.

**Response** – Leveraging the sufficiently flexible and adaptable programme design, local actors will have the relationships and channels to respond in a timely way to conflict issues, minimising the level of escalation. There will also be the analysis and infrastructure to link local actions to the necessary actors, institutions and systems at higher levels of the system, as appropriate, in particular through the coordination of the RSRTF partners themselves.

Reconciliation interventions will also include elements of capacity building which will be informed by a deeper understanding of existing capacities and gaps which will become apparent through Phase 1, as well as during the project's implementation. The importance of sustained engagement with the same people on the issues that matter to them is recognised, as it is often more about how to incentivize good governance, rule of law, or equitable conflict resolution, rather than lack of capacity on how to do so. Under reconciliation outcomes, sustainability and capacity building is oriented around four principles:

- establishing and strengthening local mechanism for conflict management, based on traditional approaches, appropriately adapted (particularly with respect to gender);
- emphasising continuity in the personnel who are taking roles in the community mechanisms;
- progressively developing the linkage between the community mechanisms and local government structures;
- discussing sustainability with the communities and the government from the early stages of the program, to move towards a sufficient level of community ownership such that systems can be maintained following RSRTF.

Finally, as discussed in greater detail in the section on *Lessons Learned*, the budget for this programme includes a discreet "crisis modifier" line to maintain flexibility and responsiveness. Experiences in other contexts have shown that such a budget line is necessary, for example, to respond to situations where initial assumptions do not hold; where a certain key dynamic was not prioritised based on initially available information; when the basic programming is sound, but for certain issues the resourcing is insufficient to properly complete a phase; or when an external force undermines activities. Examples from experience elsewhere tends to indicate that, whilst many of the above situations appear clear in hindsight, there will always be some variations or some new issue that will at times shift the dynamics on the ground. And this shift, if there are not resources available to respond quickly, can lead to rapid deterioration in the operating environment. As such, the consortium has included a crisis modifier budget line under Peace Canal's budget as they have the most agile and flexible financial system and have shown in other contexts their ability to rapidly disburse funds when necessary. Based on initial consortium meetings, the following basic criteria for use of the crisis modifier budget have been agreed upon:

#### Criteria:

1. The threshold for drawing down on the fund is a situation where an unforeseen development in the operating environment means either:
  - a. there is potential for a rapid deterioration / escalation of conflict that would be severe for communities and the ongoing work of the programme; and/or
  - b. the community actors have identified an unforeseen intervention that is a necessary pre-requisite for an already programmed RSRTF activity to go ahead.
2. There is an identifiable intervention, based on community consultation, that in the view of the ARG has a reasonable prospect of having the desired impact.
3. RSRTF strategic partners have been consulted and none are unable to conduct/have budget for the proposed activity.
4. An immediate response is within operational capacity of the RSRTF partners.
5. The proposed intervention budget is proportionate in the context of the overall programme.

#### Decision process:

The decision on funding would be made by consensus (or, if needed, majority decision) of the ARG, based on submission of a one-two page (maximum) concept and meeting within 48 hours of the submission:

- Overview and objective of the intervention.
- Why it is considered necessary (the issue it is responding to) and theory of how it will achieve the objective

- Brief risk / conflict sensitivity statement (incl. if any new risks are introduced that are not included in the existing program risk matrix).
- Feasibility – authorizing environment and operational capacity – is confirmed.
- What alternatives have been considered.
- Proposed budget envelope and to which partner it should be directed / whether cash is needed or cashflow is available.
- When a decision is needed.

#### Review

Use of the fund (or non-use, as the case may be) to be reviewed quarterly.

#### Stabilization (UNMISS, UNDP)

Phase 1, which will be conducted in close coordination with consortium partners in the reconciliation pillar, will focus on community engagement to gain clarity and understanding from the communities themselves on their vision of accountability and in what forms it would be most accepted. Injustice and grievances are often key motivations behind violence and revenge. Hence, a need exists to understand the perceptions of justice not only from victims, but also from those who implement violence in greater Tonj to develop appropriate interventions to deter, rather than perpetuate, further violence and conflict. While both the Tonj North Community Peace and Reconciliation Initiative and the report from the Joint Peace Committee for Eastern Tonj highlight the need for accountability and for the creation of courts to address crimes committed, these agreements are vague, and require further clarity to ensure these mechanisms are designed to best address community concerns. Accordingly, Phase 1 aims to capture greater Tonj communities' perceptions of justice and the desired roles of the informal and formal justice systems and the state and local government authorities. This Phase will enable the partners in the stabilization pillar to design accountability mechanisms with the appropriate mix of customary, formal and other justice actors, as well as other relevant interventions, such as those that strengthen sub-state governance.

To advance stabilization, Phase 2 support will focus on implementing grassroots driven solutions identified in Phase 1 to strengthen community mechanisms to reduce violence and associated impunity. Relevant focus areas may involve support for accountability and/or dispute resolution mechanisms intended to respond to violence in the immediate term, activities to strengthen an integrated rule of law chain (police, prosecution, judicial, and corrections) and increasing capacity of sub-state governance structures to enable them to resist improper interference from elites. Depending on the information gathered during Phase 1, specific activities may include targeted trainings to build capacity of national rule of law officials, community paralegals, defence counsel, customary chiefs, and county government officials, reforming customary laws to comply with national frameworks and human rights standards, empowering communities to enforce their rights through traditional and formal mechanisms and building infrastructure across the justice chain.

**Strengthening community dispute resolution and building linkages between the informal and formal justice systems:** Community led initiatives and mechanisms play a critical role in resolving disputes and strengthening the rule of law, reducing violence and combatting impunity. With the lack of a statutory rule of law presence and capacity in greater Tonj, informal authorities are often the only actors present to address disputes and issue decisions. However, while addressing cases outside their jurisdiction and without comprehensive knowledge of written laws and human rights standards, many informal authorities act outside their authority, commit abuses themselves and risk causing further violence and perpetuating discriminatory practices and human rights abuses, including against traditionally disenfranchised groups such as women, children and displaced persons. Furthermore, Dinka customary laws (*Wanhalef Law*), which are widely followed in all of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, contain discriminatory practices and provisions that do not fully comply with human rights standards, the Transitional Constitution or other written laws. Finally, as seen in the RSRTF supported project for WBEG and Warrap States, local government and informal justice actors are integral and necessary actors for gaining community support for the formal justice system and its decisions, facilitating access to courts for victims and witnesses and executing court judgments.

To address these issues, this project will look to incorporate targeted trainings to increase informal judicial actors' capacity and knowledge of national frameworks and human rights standards, to effectively resolve disputes and to facilitate their understanding of limits on their authority and jurisdiction. In addition to chiefs, this project will look to build and train community paralegal networks that can assist in informing victims of their rights and help them seek redress, provide legal assistance, mediate disputes, refer cases to traditional and formal judicial authorities and act as a check on local government and other informal actors to help ensure compliance with the laws of South Sudan while they are carrying out their duties. In addition to paralegals, activities will aim to build referral pathways between informal and formal authorities to ensure cases are addressed by the appropriate authority. To enhance respect for human rights and provide meaningful redress to victims in both informal and formal justice processes, this project will also conduct an assessment of the *Wanhalef Law* with the aim of aligning its provisions with international treaties,

including human rights treaties, the Transitional Constitution and other laws of South Sudan. Given the wide reach of the *Wanhalel* Law, this reform will not only enhance respect for human rights in greater Tonj, but also throughout Greater Bahr el Ghazal. Of note, the above-mentioned activities will depend on, and be informed and adjusted in accordance with, the information gathered during Phase 1.

**Strengthening accountability and the rule of law:** Resolutions from the Tonj North Community Peace and Reconciliation Initiative and the report from the Joint Peace Committee for Eastern Tonj called for the establishment of a court to address crimes committed in their communities. Based on these requests and in line with the outcomes of Phase 1, technical and logistical assistance will be provided to establish an effective accountability mechanism(s) that is able to investigate crimes, execute arrest warrants, and prosecute alleged perpetrators. The design, composition and focus of this mechanism(s), will reflect the needs of the communities and consider the particular purpose of the mechanism(s) as identified during Phase 1. It may, for example, take the form of a mobile, special or other court and incorporate traditional chiefs along with statutory judges. Such accountability mechanisms may also take the form of support to rapid response police teams, investigators, etc. The community paralegals described above will support these efforts by providing legal aid to victims/survivors and increasing community engagement. By the end of the project term, through complementary political advocacy and good offices, these shorter-term rapid response mechanisms will be institutionalized within judicial and other state and local institutions to encourage sustainability.

In addition to immediate short-term responses that aim to promote peace and stability and deter future violence, strengthening accountability and rule of law in greater Tonj will also require investment in building judicial, prosecutorial, police and corrections capacity to build a strong and integrated justice chain that can deter violence, provide meaningful redress, and build trust in the government, judicial and security actors. Relevant interventions may include targeted trainings to the formal justice chain to strengthen skills to effectively respond to conflict drivers and criminal patterns, such as murder, abduction and cattle raiding. In addition to building the capacity of justice chain actors, this project will support complementary interventions and engagements to build formal justice presence in priority areas in greater Tonj to sustain shorter-term project gains in the long-term. To ensure this presence is sustainable, targeted rule of law infrastructure development must be undertaken in key areas, such as the rehabilitation or construction of police posts, courthouses, prosecution offices and correctional facilities. The need for such infrastructure has become apparent during past engagements in the area when justice chain actors, such as police forces, have been brought to locations to provide security but soon abandoned their post as their presence could not be sustained due to lack of local infrastructure. This has been raised repeatedly in previous and ongoing UNMISS and UNDP engagement with government officials at the state level (including joint monitoring visits by UNDP with donors and Rule of Law Forum). This dynamic has been observed, in particular, in the context of the "joint police forces" that have been proposed to be established in the border areas of WBEG and Warrap states. Past reports from the 2019 and 2020 migration seasons directly referenced the lack of infrastructure as a key reason that the few police who were deployed to the Tonj area abandoned their posts. Logistical constraints have continued to plague efforts to temporarily deploy police during 2022.

To further strengthen the rule of law in greater Tonj and enhance community security, adapted and non-violent community policing activities will be implemented. Community policing has been requested in the resolutions from the Tonj North Community Peace and Reconciliation initiative. To strengthen local mechanisms for conflict management, community security and social cohesion, youth will be trained, supported and mentored to take on managerial roles to establish context adapted mechanisms for community security. This could be done through coaching sessions, participatory assessments and promotion of civilian protection techniques in conjunction with community structures to establish context adapted mechanisms for community security and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) mechanisms. Such mechanisms will be strengthened through participatory knowledge building processes within communities to ensure responsive and beneficiary-led programming and assisting community members to identify and assess risk factors drawing on past experiences. A range of tools may be used, including safety audits, community mapping, patrols, focus group discussions or key individual interviews, developing context-appropriate EWER mechanisms, as well as to map security/ safety risks / support networks and response services.

**Enhancing accountable and responsible local governance:** As weak governance and lack of security forces in greater Tonj perpetuates communal violence, support for county, payam and boma administrators, as well as women, youth and elders' groups, will contribute to reducing violence and creating and upholding locally negotiated agreements that reflect the needs of the affected communities. The relevant governance actors and structures that will be the focus of support will be identified during Phase 1 as referenced under the reconciliation pillar. Building the capacity of these actors to govern in a manner that is accountable to the citizens they serve and enabling underserved citizens to meaningfully participate in decision-making, will serve as a check on elite actors at the state and national level and encourage impactful solutions to issues that will enhance reconciliation, justice and accountability and protect civilians and their property. Relevant activities may include supporting the establishment of representative forums of relevant actors (women, youth, elders) supporting local authorities and women, youth and elders participate in local peace dialogues and locally led agreements and building the capacity of local authorities and groups to

govern. Given the influence of Warrap elites at the national level in local conflicts in greater Tonj, a workshop, conference or other forum will be utilized to enhance engagement between these actors and help ensure local level governance concerns and issues are effectively addressed. Importantly, these activities will focus on existing local government authorities and community structures identified and developed under the reconciliation pillar. In addition to strengthening local governments to counter-act negative elite influences, some activities under this intervention may also include influential persons from the national level or the diaspora who are able to make positive contributions to de-escalate conflicts and encourage stability in the greater Tonj region.

**Advocacy:** Traditional and contemporary community level engagement will be complemented by state and national level engagement in a coordinated manner. These engagements need to be inclusive of executive, legislative, judicial, protection, and security functions. Additionally, advocacy to state and local authorities and outreach to communities will be undertaken in relation to all project activities to ensure local buy-in and understanding. Radio programmes will be utilised given their wide reach of listeners in greater Tonj, including to raise awareness of rule of law and accountability issues and activities.

It is anticipated that the organization and delivery of trainings to enhance accountable and responsible local governance will be led by UNMISS (Kujok Field Office). To complement the above activities and promote further stabilisation, UNMISS Kujok field office and UNMISS sections will work closely with UNMISS Force to effectively utilise stabilisation patrols and Temporary Operating Bases to further enhance the stabilisation effect of the outlined activities. The above interventions will also complement those undertaken under the reconciliation and resilience pillars. As noted above, structures established under the reconciliation pillar will be supported to exercise their key governance functions, thus contributing to stabilisation activities. Opportunities for synergies will also be explored with the resilience component, such as the possibility of providing vocational training to prisoners and supporting prison agricultural projects.

#### **Resilience (WFP, ADRA, TOCH)**

As described, the intent of the phased project design is to enable the communities to have sufficient time to collaborate in considering the sources of violence and what may usefully mitigate them, and to enable flexible responses that are designed according to the needs and priorities agreed upon by the various groups in conflict. Resilience partners have therefore set out the below broad programmatic parameters based on initial analysis and extensive community-based participatory planning (CBPP) exercises carried out in February and March 2022 in the 22 hotspot bomas in greater Tonj. However, specifics around geographic targeting and sequencing will be decided based on the outcomes of interventions conducted by the reconciliation pillar in Phase I, combined with an in-depth, multi-dimensional social networks analysis and a resilience capital analysis.

In Phase II, the selected interventions will be implemented, with the intention to support communities to rebuild their livelihoods and improve their resilience. Partners will design interventions to intentionally strengthen the prospects for peace since experience has shown that immediate and incremental contributions to peace through livelihoods activities are not only achievable in conflict hotspots, but they also represent meaningful contributions to resilience. Enhancing access to livelihoods for youths, particularly, reduces the ability for elites to exploit local grievances and mobilize communities for organised violence. Furthermore, resilience to (conflict) shocks is strengthened when interventions reduce the impact of violence on household and community assets, while simultaneously enhancing access and mobility. Such incremental gains in stability (if not peace) help build a foundation for more expanded efforts to achieve positive peace, through complementary or sequential programming by RSRTF partners and others.

Based on extensive CBPP conducted by WFP, TOCH, and ADRA in February and March 2022, the following high-level interventions will be prioritised:

**Food for Assets:** As the targeted households will be identified from populations facing extreme or severe food insecurity, beneficiary households will continue to receive food assistance during each project year's lean season. The food assistance will ensure that people undertaking livelihoods and asset creation activities and participating in other project activities, including reconciliation and stabilisation activities, have enough caloric intake for labour intensive activities. The food assistance will be key to ensuring that households are able to devote time to asset creation activities, community dialogue, and other project activities instead of undertaking existing activities to meet household food needs. This is essential to ensuring that food security is not compromised during the lean season in favour of participation in project activities. It should be noted that whereas Food for Assets (FFA) programming has historically focused on supporting physical asset creation, this project will also consider participation in peacebuilding and stabilization interventions as a community investment worth compensation. Indeed, the opportunity cost of participating in peacebuilding and stabilization activities may be high. This could especially be the case for poor and very poor households facing challenges of time-poverty already. Long-term and consistent allocation of time to peacebuilding and stabilization activities, such as remaining active in committees, delegations, information gathering,



and acting as liaisons may entail high costs requiring in-kind or cash compensation which can be provided through adapted FFA programming.

**Asset development:** Assets created to preserve or enhance mobility (including assets focused on a community's ability to control water flow and assets for the benefit of pastoralist communities) can greatly contribute to peace as mobility is a primary point of interaction between livelihoods and organised violence in greater Tonj.

- **Access and feeder roads:** Enhanced mobility will allow communities to take advantage of seasonal food opportunities and market access and support pastoralist livelihoods which also require semi-annual transhuman migration between relatively permanent, wet-season settlements and larger, more condensed, temporary dry-season cattle camps. Enhanced mobility can also establish and improve connections within and between communities.
- **Water and flood control assets:** Given the overlap of recurrent pockets of food insecurity and organised violence on Tonj's flood plains, both rain and riverine flooding are relevant to mobility and affect competition over natural resources, such as pasture. The project will therefore prioritise flood control assets for the protection of productive land and residential infrastructure. Enhancing any community's ability to mitigate the impact of excess water, especially when organised violence keeps them from making use of typical elevated ground, would directly contribute to both food security and peace. Similarly, allowing communities to retain water collected during the rainy season could mitigate conflict over water resources in the dry season. Equally the establishment of strategic water ponds for livestock and human consumption increases access to water and improves community cohesion. The more water points there are the less the chances of conflict over limited water resources during dry season migration. Mapping out the transhuman routes against area of conflicts and water points will improve pastoralists access to limited water resources. It should be noted that flood control assets require technical skillsets in engineering to be available to the designers and builders. This project also recognises that any changes in the movement and storage of water may have a wide range of positive and negative impacts. Failure to anticipate the redirecting of water from one community into another, for example, may present a conflict sensitivity risk.
- **Assets for the benefit of pastoralist communities and cattle camps:** The dearth of economic deprivation in greater Tonj renders communities vulnerable to exploitation, in particular young, cattle keeping, males who are often exposed to military and violent exploitation. Livestock losses due to raids as well as flood-related disease and mortality renders cattle keeping youths particularly vulnerable to food insecurity, particularly those residing in cattle camps, which are rarely targeted for assistance. This entails that partners rethink how they conceptualise vulnerability for purposes of targeting. This project will therefore intentionally target cattle camps and fully pastoral communities. Cattle camp sites typically remain the same year after year, though which social groups can make use of a given site may depend on politics and organised violence. Critical periods for intense violence seem to be the transitions between dry and rainy seasons and rainy and dry seasons when the configuration of cattle camps is in greatest flux. Investment in pastoralist assets may range from basic cattle byres and fencing, especially to demarcate agricultural land and prevent grazing on crops, to assets to improve and maintain livestock water access, up to more creative, unorthodox assets, such as the construction of look-out posts to prevent raids. These may come to include improvements to static cattle camp sites, such as literally raising up the sites above high-water height or the construction of entirely new cattle camp sites. Any work on cattle camp sites would have to involve extensive community consultations, particularly new construction, with the target and neighbouring communities.

**Livelihoods interventions as peace dividends and sources of peace:** Based on the outcomes of Phase I, as well as in-built participatory approaches, partners will identify livelihood activities which should be prioritised to effectively raise the cost of mobilisation of rural youths, which ensures the prevention of new catalytic incidents, or which enhance connection between communities.

- **Enhanced access to livelihoods in conflict hotspots:** While partners have extensive experience supporting livelihoods and resilience programming in greater Tonj, hotspots of violence have generally not benefited equitably from development and resilience programming. Similarly, rural and cattle camp youths are rarely targeted for resilience and livelihoods programming. Nevertheless, since young men are often the perpetrators of violence (as well as its victims), their interest and participation will be critical for the success of the project. As such, project partners will increase their risk tolerance by focusing resilience and development programming in areas prone to violence and by intentionally targeting youth and women associated with armed groups (including both *gelweng* and formal combatants; see more detail below). Where feasible, partners will also identify and support opportunities for joint programming – including co-production and sharing of resource use agreements – between beneficiaries from communities in conflict.
- **Supporting and diversifying agro-pastoral livelihoods (on-farm interventions):** To assess the most feasible and relevant livelihood activities, partners will conduct a rapid market and livelihood assessments as well as a

mapping and assessment of relevant institutions, traders, market groups, and producer groups. Based on the assessment, beneficiaries will be targeted for livelihoods and vocational training. Partners will support beneficiaries to open and prepare farmlands and increase areas under production. Targeted populations will also receive seeds, tools and training through skills transfers on climate smart agricultural and post-harvest management skills, and small scale irrigation. Partners will support the expansion of crop and livelihood diversity as part of a climate adaptation approach. Interventions will also support activities relating to water and pasture management, including basic sustainable rangeland management interventions to improve and rehabilitate grasslands. Pastoralists' indigenous or local knowledge on herding practices and adaptation strategies will be utilised. Abundant manure also provides great potential for agricultural interventions. Vegetable, short-maturing cereals (maize and sorghum) and groundnut varieties can be cultivated in well-designed and demarcated plots in cattle camps.

- **Technical and vocational education and training (off-farm interventions):** Partners will also look to diversify access to off-farm livelihoods for youth in particular, which will build on lessons learned from a pilot project in Tonj North (run by TOCH) where armed youth were demobilised and given access to alternative livelihoods. Youths will be drawn from *gelweng* groups in coordination with local authorities and community-based peace committees to undergo vocational education and training in areas such as tailoring, masonry, hairdressing, barbering, and milk processing and dairy production. Participants will subsequently be provided with start-up grants and equipment and trained on market dynamics.

#### Market linkages as sources of peace:

- **Participatory extension approaches:** These will include farmer field schools; lead farmer/farmer-to farmer approaches, innovation platforms, village-based demonstration sites, farmer market schools, and exposure and learning visits based on a strong layering approach. These participatory spaces will enable targeted communities to attain livelihoods recovery outcomes on a development trajectory. The approaches are designed to have a positive impact on capacity building, building social relations, engendering peace and economic benefits, triggering community action and setting systems where information flows, resulting in stakeholders being empowered to test new strategies that better define market opportunities. Training is a central component of extensions; using different approaches suitable for the diverse capabilities and learning needs of members from farmer groups. Plenary, and hands-on, cross learning (through exposure visits and farmer-organised field days, at demo sites) will be applied to cater for the diverse priorities of farmers.
- **Learning centres, demonstration sites, and learning visits:** The project will establish learning centres and crop and vegetable demonstration sites across greater Tonj. These will be centres for interaction for farmers from different communities, extension agents, and private sector players (input suppliers, agro equipment suppliers) for knowledge sharing and field testing of technologies. Each will comprise a central site for training and field days with a demonstration area to showcase agro-ecological aspects in crop production, improved post-harvest management practices, and improved agro-pastoral practices. The demonstration sites will also exhibit climate-smart agriculture. Practical exercises will only be conducted until participants have had an adequate hands-on feel of the exercise and gained sufficient skills to carry out the exercise on their own. The project will also support field days and intra- and inter-community exchange visits, with the latter bringing together farmers who experience the same physical, climatic, social, and economic characteristics. The interactions will allow the farmers to appreciate, learn and adopt best practices enabling the farmers to proactively test and eventually select innovations which suit their environment and needs.
- **Private Public Partnerships (PPP) in agriculture extension:** The project will support a pluralistic extension system where extension, knowledge and technology transfer will be provided by multiple sources, including public extension services, private companies (agro dealers), and research institutions. The Private Public Partnership will be key in backward and forward market linkages. Farmers will be linked to inputs service providers (backward) and to markets for their produces (forward).

**Skill building:** Finally, and as already described above, market linkages, livelihoods support, and asset creation will be complemented by different forms of skill-building to maximise the benefits of such assets, such as different forms of maintenance, fodder production, boosting milk yield, and veterinary care. Skills development is integrated throughout the programme, equipping participants with new pastoral, agricultural, infrastructure development, and maintenance, and environmental management skills. Partners will also expand existing educational radio talk shows already supported by ADRA in Tonj: "Talking Farming through Community Radio". These talk shows have acted as effective substitutes for formal education, enabling communities to learn, articulate and share concerns, experiences, and to critically examine peace and other development issues and policies affecting them. Partners will scale up and consolidate the Talking Farming program for communities in Greater Tonj to share their farming experiences and to critically examine consolidation of peace initiatives. Issues will be debated upon using the radio and immediate feedback given. Vital information on community engagement, peace, better farming methods, improved seeds, timely

planting, agro-forestry, better harvesting methods, soil conservation, marketing, post-harvest handling and dietary diversification will form part of the discussion topics.

*B. Interrelation and Sequencing*

The project is structured in three phases. **Phase 0, the preparation phase** (the first 1-2 months of the project), will be used to clearly outline, consolidate, and analyse the processes, outcomes, and lessons learned from previous and ongoing interventions, dialogues, and research in greater Tonj. The analysis will result in an updated, gendered analysis of prevailing conflict dynamics, a mapping of key entry points for social cohesion and accountability interventions, and a mapping of key actors and stakeholders, including existing locally driven mechanisms contributing to a reduction of community violence. Simultaneously, resilience partners will conduct an in-depth, multi-dimensional social networks analysis and a resilience capital analysis to better define how resilience interventions can – and do – contribute to social cohesion (or strengthening of social networks) and resilience to conflict shocks.

**Phase 1, the engagement phase**, will focus on the relational and analytical foundations for a successful peacebuilding agenda and will involve 3 – 4 months of community engagement. Details of Phase 1 are set out above, under the Reconciliation strategy. The outcomes of Phase 1 will also help clarify community priorities, including requests for courts, special courts, and mobile courts that have emerged in recent resolutions and communiqués, by providing an understanding of communities’ perceptions of justice and the desired roles of the informal and formal justice systems and the state and local government authorities.

The transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2, will be via a Greater Tonj Conference that articulates in consolidated form the negotiated position of the different interest groups. It will identify the issues and the proposed mechanisms for addressing them. The result of this will be an implementation matrix that will be the collective accountability document for the communities and the RSRTF partners. RSRTF partners, whilst setting broad programmatic parameters based on initial analysis, reserve judgment on specifics to ensure that it is aligned with the inter-group agreement on priorities. Specifics around geographic targeting and sequencing will also be decided based on the outcomes of interventions conducted in Phase 1.

In **Phase 2, the implementation phase**, selected resilience and stabilisation interventions will be implemented. It is important to recognise that in the complex dynamics of this programming, many of these opportunities will only emerge as the program moves forward, and cannot be predicted in advance. What is therefore central to the strategy here is a system that will make visible these opportunities (and, where relevant, risks) in a timely manner, with an equally timely mechanism to adapt responsively. This is about shifting emphasis to real-time reporting, and away from the intensive detail of descriptive narrative to the sense-making, lessons learned and ‘so what?’ elements of the reports. For this to function, there also needs to be the budgeting flexibility (“crisis modifier” described above) to implement next steps that haven’t been foreshadowed, which is why this has such emphasis in the overall proposal. This strategy means that while more comprehensive reports are submitted to donors in due course, overview reports are circulated internally and with partners within days of activities being completed. This is complemented by the real-time management/coordination discussions that pivot programming as it is underway. It is this dynamic of program management that the Reconciliation pillar will focus on in its decision-making.

The ongoing dialogue work in Phase 2 will be able to support sense-checks, conflict sensitivity, informal feedback and possible pivots around the resilience and stabilization pillars. Without the stabilisation pillar, the emerging peace governance structures will remain too fluid and fragile to be sustainable. Without the reconciliation pillar, the technical options and support from the stabilisation perspective risk following formal best practice that is not properly adapted to the context and integrated into community owned practices and proposals. Similarly, while the reconciliation activities will identify key resilience interventions that may contribute to peace and be considered as tangible peace dividends, resilience interventions will also look for specific peacebuilding opportunities that could enhance or connect elements of the resilience programming as it unfolds. The below table provides an example of how reconciliation, stabilisation, and resilience interventions will feed in and build on one-another. Please note that this is an illustrative example only.

	Reconciliation	Stabilisation	Resilience
Phase 1	Primary activity – community dialogue to address historical grievances and identify practical ways forward	Support activity – formative discussions with communities, traditional and formal authorities on possible support through formal / customary / hybrid justice structures	Support activity – formative conversations on possible resilience interventions and initial compromise positions on the targeting, mitigating downstream community resistance.

Phase 2	Support activity – facilitation of conflict sensitivity awareness for court personnel; sustained community engagement to pick up signals on community perception of the court structures.	<b>Primary activity – Empowering communities to improve security conditions, peacefully resolve disputes, and access justice through support to traditional and formal accountability mechanisms, and judicial and policing infrastructure and service delivery</b>	Support activity – disputes around resource management and equitable distribution of dividends referred to the emerging communal structures for informal arbitration as test cases.
	Support activity – work program linked (pre, post and/or during) with trust building dialogue activities, strengthening relationships and enhancing trust building through the resilience intervention.	Support Activity – Enabling effective community-based disputes resolution processes to peacefully resolve emerging conflicts during the project cycle	<b>Primary activity – food for assets program that supports communities in identifying strategic assets for community development and enabling household support for those contributing to the construction.</b>

The project was designed and is structured to ensure coherence, interrelation, and strategic sequencing throughout. While a Coordination Team will support the overall coordinated approach, the three pillars are individually led by organisations from the consortium. Reconciliation activities are coordinated by Peace Canal. Stabilization activities are coordinated by UNMISS. Resilience activities are coordinated by WFP.

**Note:** decisions on where to establish and layer interventions will be carefully decided so as to ensure equitable access along sub-ethnic fault lines, so as not to contribute to further grievances and potential cycles of violence.

*C. Political Engagement Strategy*

This project recognises that elite power dynamics greatly impact conflict dynamics in greater Tonj. The external politics are both enmeshed in the local dynamics and distant from it. Increasingly, formal and informal armed actors in greater Tonj, as well as the communities from which they hail, are aware of how elites – in Juba, Kuajok, and the diaspora – instrumentalise local grievances for personal gains. Local communities are increasingly adamant that the process must be led at the community level, and higher-level interference is strongly resisted. At the same time, experiences of partners in other settings have demonstrated both the power of the elites to sabotage activities as well as the power of the local communities to ensure activities go ahead even with resistance from some elites. As such, the project uses a dual strategy: maintaining an authorizing environment through engagement with military and political elites but maintaining ownership at the community level. The project is therefore designed to emphasize community driven interventions focusing on negative peace actions which address grassroots layers of violence and promote explicit links to longer term resilience and stability. As seen in other contexts, immediate and incremental contributions to negative peace are achievable despite ongoing and extant higher level conflict dynamics. This occurs primarily through reducing the impact of violence on households and communities, in particular mobility and freedom of movement, and gradually reducing the ability for elites to exploit local grievances and mobilize communities for organized violence. At the same time, partnerships with and engagement of civil society organizations, like the Dotbaai Peace initiative, will allow for accurate early warning, community engagement, and management of negative political and military influences.

Nevertheless, consortium partners recognize the need to mitigate both the risk of persistent national, state, and local level politics exacerbating conflict dynamics, as well as the risk of elite capture, manipulation, or undermining of RSRTF programming and investments. Experience elsewhere has highlighted that distinction is necessary between actors who maliciously undermine peacebuilding initiatives and actors might become spoilers for lack of sufficient engagement. Lessons from such experiences show that rigorous communication with all relevant political and military stakeholders can address the latter risk. To that end, partners will identify key government and elite changemakers, peace influencers, and spoilers in Phase 0 and 1. The stakeholder and power mapping, which will allow for deeper understanding of political dynamics at all levels, will be updated regularly in recognition of the high levels of turnover of political leaders in state and sub-state positions, particularly as uncertainty surrounding the political longevity of different elites from greater Tonj increases in the run-up to planned elections in 2023. Partners will actively engage with identified stakeholders to create the foundations for an authorizing environment, including through obtaining written commitments from relevant actors and developing appropriate coordination mechanisms, which can support a level of accountability throughout the project cycle. In Phase 2, stabilisation partners will focus on building the capacity of sub-national and sub-state actors to govern in a manner that is accountable to the citizens they serve while also, importantly, serving as a check on actors at the state and national level to prevent elite capture, manipulation, or sabotage. Such complementary activities, which directly target political and military elites can ensure they don't feel 'left out', which can mitigate the risk of negative interference.

Partners will use also UNMISS-identified offices and relationships developed during the project cycle to ensure consistent state and national level sensitisation and engagement in a coordinated manner. These engagements will be inclusive of the executive, legislative, judicial, protection, and security functions. Additionally, advocacy to state and local authorities and sensitisation will be undertaken at all political levels in relation to all project activities to ensure understanding and, ideally, buy-in, while simultaneously guarding against undue influence or manipulation. CAD HQ has committed to support the ABP on political engagement in Juba. However, depending on the pertinence of the issues to engage on, UNMISS will also use the office of the DSRSGs, SRSG and if need be diplomatic community will be involved. Experience from Jonglei programming has shown how strong advocacy from multiple directions (UNMISS, RCO, and diplomatic community) can help mitigate instances of negative elite interference.

#### D. Geographic Targeting

As mentioned above, the outcomes of Phase 1 will help clarify community priorities, including the exact geographic targeting of interventions to be conducted in Phase 2. For the project to be a success, it is crucial that partners maintain agility in terms of responsiveness throughout this phase. However, it is also important to recognise that in the complex dynamics of this programming, many opportunities for peace contributions will only emerge as the program moves forward and cannot be predicted in advance. What is therefore central to the strategy here is a system that will make visible these opportunities (and, where relevant, risks) in a timely manner, with an equally timely mechanism to adapt responsively. Indeed, even after geographic targeting is decided in Phase 1, certain communities or individuals may realise they are dissatisfied in some way as to the decisions and priorities set by project partners and there needs to be some flexibility to adjust to legitimate unforeseen concerns.

Furthermore, the project recognises that peacebuilding efforts in greater Tonj have at times failed because they lack the resourcing and scope to cover the maximum geographic and social extent of a given situation of violence, often focusing only on the social groups immediately engaged in the use of organised violence. Even when external interventions have successfully supported communities in moving towards peace to some degree, local successes often do not add up to peace at a higher societal, political, and institutional level. This project seeks to address this gap by targeting a wide as possible geographic and social scope, including dynamics which cross state boundaries into Lakes, Unity, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, with interventions designed to take a networked approach.

Separately, it should be noted that stabilization activities will be targeted according to legal and government requirements – e.g. gazette locations for courts – as well as selected infrastructural needs, accessibility, equitability, and community and requirements. Importantly, decisions on targeting of stabilisation infrastructure – including police posts, courts, and prison facilities – will be rationalised and sequenced to create complete justice chains that can enable stability for resilience work and can be mobilized to areas closer to communities.

Furthermore, while partners have extensive experience supporting peacebuilding and resilience programming in greater Tonj, hotspots of violence have generally not benefited equitably as they are often perceived to be inaccessible. As such, project partners will increase their risk tolerance by focusing programming in areas prone to violence. The project will benefit from working with local partners, particularly TOCH, and their flexibility to reach the more remote locations because of their greater contextual awareness and relationships. This allows us to mitigate security risks in a way that is not always possible with external agencies.

Finally, partners recognise the risk that the 2022 and 2023 rainy seasons will impact interventions and create logistical challenges. As such, the programme was designed to prioritize the majority of engagement interventions (Phase 1) in the first 6 months, so as to make the most of the 2022/2023 dry season for implementing stabilization and resilience interventions. In any case, due to recent road works, Tonj South and Tonj North will remain largely accessible by car throughout the rainy season and motor bikes have been budgeted for to ensure remoter, harder-to-reach payams in Tonj East (and Tonj North) will also be accessible.

#### 6. DESCRIPTION OF TARGET GROUPS:

As described above, this project will engage those directly responsible for initiating violence in programming across all pillars. Based on experience elsewhere, project partners wish to overcome the prevailing narrative which singularly describes armed youth as criminals and perpetrators of human rights violations. Focusing on this dimension tends to characterise them as a problem to mitigate rather than exploring the possibility they could make a substantively positive contribution to the peace. However, the line between violence-oriented choices and peace-oriented choices is more fluid than is perceived externally; generally linked to an economic choice. As such, partners will intentionally target youth (and women) associated with armed groups (including both *gelweng* and formed combatants) for resilience and livelihoods programming. In light of the fluid way in which multiple roles may be held in communities, such that one person may be concurrently or at separate times a cattle herder, a member of a militia or an ex-combatant, and may at different times respond to priorities defined by lineage-based social groups, and other territorial or ethnic relationships, resilience interventions will, through a community-based approach, also ensure that

that targeting of beneficiaries is done in such a way as to simultaneously enhance access to livelihoods for (armed) youths and to effectively raise the cost for mobilisation for violence.

At the same time, partners recognise the importance of supporting traditional and informal mechanisms at the community level. However, while the project's reconciliation activities prioritise and value the roles of traditional, spiritual, and religious leaders, it should be noted that women are culturally not given a central leadership role in the traditional structures. Partners will work to create separate forums for women to build confidence and formulate strategic approaches to influencing male dominated spaces. Within this context, partners will build on lessons learned from women-led peace initiatives in greater Tonj, where women have been able to utilise their societal role in generating honour and shame to offer disincentives for a range of behaviours related to violence.

Livelihoods and resilience interventions will also intentionally target women as it is recognised that the transformation agenda for achieving the interconnected goals of gender equality, women's economic empowerment, and enhancing resilience must begin with gender-accommodating interventions, while gradually introducing gender-transformative inputs and ideas to communities. At this point in time, gender accommodating resilience programming in Tonj can promote women's spheres of empowerment, particularly in subsistence agriculture or pastoralism: food production, processing, provisioning, and nutrition.

Finally, personnel from the area can be at risk in different ways, which is why targeting around recruitment (and relevant balances) is as important as targeting around beneficiaries. Peace Canal will support project partners in implementing principles of strategic and conflict sensitive recruitment from lessons learned in Rumbek and Jonglei/Pibor, where the approach (a) gained strong community acceptance of the personnel and (b) where the balance of the team enabled different configurations to be deployed to different areas without unacceptable risk levels to the individuals.

#### 7. EXISTING COMPLEMENTARY ACTIONS / STRUCTURES:

This project will build on partners' extensive knowledge of the context in greater Tonj and their relationship with national, state and local authorities and NGOs. Each member of the consortium has specialized experience, knowledge and skills under their respective pillars and engages with the affected communities in greater Tonj on a regular and ongoing basis. The partners' current and previous experience in greater Tonj provides the consortium with proximity to the affected communities, the ability to deploy logistical arrangements, such as temporary operating bases, to support activities and address surges of violence, and an understanding of community needs from the ground up. This enables the consortium to work together in a contextually appropriate response, which is attuned to existing needs and enhances flexibility and efficiency by involving local aid actors with more meaningful humanitarian decision-making. Simultaneously, project partners have and will continue to explore opportunities for longer-term collaborative and complementary partnerships.

UNMISS maintains a field office in Warrap State that has a vast understanding of the operational context in greater Tonj and extensive experience in the protection of civilians, peacebuilding, stabilisation and rule of law, as well as the provision of basic social services dating from the pre-independence period. Through its military, police and civilian components, UNMISS implements various activities in greater Tonj, including engagement with greater Tonj peace dialogues, aimed at deterring violence, building confidence and trust between communities, and between communities and the local government. Additionally, UNMISS engages in activities related to reconciliation, promotion of human rights, rule of law and accountability, capacity building for law enforcement agencies, gender promotion and other activities that contribute to building durable peace in Tonj South, Tonj North, Tonj East and other counties of Warrap State. A few examples of recent activities in greater Tonj that will be built on and complemented by this project are the renovation of the Tonj North Prison, past workshops and trainings for customary leaders, regular engagement with rule of law actors in Kuajok and Tonj South and the ongoing rehabilitation of the Tonj-Romich road. The office of the Head of Field Office (HOFO) in Kuajok is well-positioned to engage politically at all levels with the local, sub-national and national levels of government and is supplemented by the SRSG's office. This political engagement will be essential to the successful implementation of any greater Tonj area programme.

In addition to UNMISS' regular engagement with local, regional and national officials and judicial authorities to strengthen the administration of justice in greater Tonj, this project will build on and complement past UNMISS support to special and mobile courts in the region. During 2020 and 2021, UNMISS supported the Greater Tonj Special Court to address cases relating to sectional violence to ensure accountability for serious crimes, promote fair trial standards and reduce case backlogs, as well as to enhance existing peace processes to decrease tensions and increase stability. In coordination with the judiciary and the Governors of WBEG and Warrap States, UNMISS also facilitated the establishment and operations of the Joint Special Mobile Court (JSMC) for WBEG and Warrap States. This Court, which was funded under the WBEG/Warrap RSRTF area-based programme, was established to address key conflict drivers and adjudicate sectional disputes in the border areas of the two States, including in Tonj North and Tonj South. The presence of the JSMC and its resulting deterrent effect has contributed to improving peace and

stability in the border areas of the two States, increased compliance with local agreements regulating cattle migration, reduced crime, facilitated the voluntary return of IDPs to the homes they abandoned during past conflicts and increased access to justice to remote and vulnerable communities. The ongoing impact of this Court and other activities under the RSRTF project for WBEG and Warrap States will enable this consortium for greater Tonj to build on these previous successes and increase the impact of similar activities by incorporating best practices, promoting peaceful migration between States and enhancing relations and interlinkages between the different sections in the two States.

UNMISS is furthermore involved in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) activities in Warrap and WBEG that will complement the aims outlined in this project. First, UNMISS is supporting the National DDR Commission to conduct an assessment and develop profiles for ex-combatants and communities in WBEG and Warrap States to inform the development of a pilot community violence reduction (CVR) project for these States. This assessment and future CVR activities may contribute to stabilisation in greater Tonj and help inform resilience programming. Second, in April 2022, UNMISS together with UNDP will kick off its Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT) project that seeks to improve control of small arms and reduce access to firearms and ammunition, and to ensure populations-at-risk benefit from armed violence prevention and reduction programmes. The assessment will gauge the knowledge of police on small arms control and seek to improve their knowledge and understanding of the voluntary civilian disarmament strategy. As outlined in the context analysis, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a key conflict driver that is allowing for the impact of violence to escalate beyond traditional weaponry and norms previously allowed.

WFP has a long history of implementing asset creation and livelihoods support activities in Greater Tonj – the area was one of the first places where WFP invested in livelihood strengthening at South Sudan's independence. WFP has also been implementing livelihoods and pastoral interventions in neighbouring counties since 2020. Thanks to this experience, WFP has gained a strong understanding of how to work and advance with agro-pastoral populations who move seasonally to access various natural resources. WFP's field office in Kuajok is presently working in roughly 100 bomas (communities) in Warrap state, including in all payams of greater Tonj, and has established a presence and operational partnerships with NGOs, local authorities and communities throughout greater Tonj. These existing operational arrangements will allow for a quick and immediate roll-out of the project as close relationships already exist with key stakeholders. Furthermore, WFP financially and technically supports the State Resilience Platform – a coordinating platform for resilience activities of multiple partners in greater Tonj, providing oversight and technical support to these partners with six-line ministries and the Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC). The Platform will serve as a key tool for engaging the state government, ensuring local ownership and facilitating collaboration between WFP, its partner(s) and the government.

ADRA similarly has a depth of experience working on livelihoods and markets with farmers and livelihoods groups, in particular focusing on reducing the social distance between and among communities in greater Tonj through inter-county market linkages. ADRA has connected farmers in Tonj South with Tonj North (Luanyaker market), Tonj East (Romic and Wolith markets) and Wau. This project will build on these gains and layer activities on top of existing initiatives. Through joint programming with WFP, ADRA has responded to climate change effects through introduction of RICE, a value chain that has resulted in increased productivity and diversified incomes, as well as improved food security. ADRA has also established and registered the Tonj South Farmers' Cooperative, comprised of nine producer groups. A similar model will be replicated in target areas of this project, with all cooperatives linked for better market linkages. Although ADRA is operating in Greater Tonj, it is based in Tonj town. The organization does not have operational presence in Tonj East and North. For this reason, the administration budget is taking into consideration the need to establish operational offices in those two locations, thereby showing administrative costs for the two counties. However, the RSRTF activities are planned and budgeted for all the 3 counties in Greater Tonj.

TOCH has been involved in peacebuilding and livelihoods interventions for several years in Tonj. TOCH is currently implementing a peacebuilding program in partnership with CAFOD in Tonj North County, consisting of three pillars: a) building local capacities for peace; b) providing platforms for dialogue; and c) vocational training. From 2013 – 2021, TOCH implemented a peacebuilding project in partnership with Saferworld in Tonj South and Tonj North County, which included the establishment Community Action Groups (CAGs), which were trained on participatory community action planning as well as peacebuilding and conflict management, and remain functional. Finally, TOCH was sub-granted RSRTF funds from IOM and FAO to implement conflict-reduction activities targeting bordering communities between Warrap (Tonj) and Western Bahr el Ghazal (Jur River). The current RSRTF project is designed to account for lessons learned from previous TOCH projects, build upon gains made, including existing peace committees, and expand the social scope and scale of targeted communities. In particular, the current project will build on successful TOCH interventions supporting youth and women-led peacebuilding activities. Women and youth groups that have been engaged under CAFOD supported projects will provide the foundation for further community engagement under RSRTF funding.

**Other complementary actions and structures:** Beyond the interventions directly implemented by, through, or with support from consortium partners, there a number of other programmes and interventions in greater Tonj and a

variety of actors working across the triple nexus that consortium partners will look to engage and coordinate with. These actors include Nonviolent Peaceforce, FAO, IOM, World Vision, and Lukluk Community Association for Development (LCAD) who implement complementary peacebuilding and nexus programming – including RSRTF-funded projects. ICRC, VSF, UNOPS, Islamic Relief, and Save the Children also conduct crucial complementary resilience, livelihoods, and service provision interventions. The government is also undertaking a number of peacebuilding and stabilization actions, including through deploying traditional chiefs across Tonj to address cycles of violence and an ongoing disarmament process. While these actions may not always fully align with the RSRTF and consortium partners' approach, engagement and coordination is nonetheless crucial.

Coordination with other reconciliation and peace partners will be addressed formally through the already existing Peace Actors Forum, and informally through sustained engagement bilaterally on the ground. Coordination with other stabilization actors and programmes will happen formally through the Warrap Rule of Law Working Group. Coordination on resilience actions will happen through the State Resilience Platform, which will allow for coordination with complementary programmes such as FEED II (FAO and World Vision) as well as other partners engaged in resilience activities. The consortium will also engage (and where possible participate) in regular ARG coordination meetings of RSRTF programmes in Koch and along the Western Bahr el Ghazal/Warrap border, to ensure complementarity and that achievements are built on and strengthened.

As seen with area-based programming and RSRTF-funded projects elsewhere, it will also be crucial to have coordination across the three pillars of reconciliation, stabilization, and resilience. As such, the Area Reference Group will be opened up to representatives from the various existing coordination mechanisms, interventions, and partners. These actors will be engaged from the very beginning to ensure their inputs adequately incorporated into the Area Reference Group strategy so as to ensure complementarity, coherence, and coordination of geographic approaches and interventions. As with other ABP areas, this will be somehow dependent on the willingness of non-consortium partners to participate in these conversations.

## 8. EVIDENCE BASED PROGRAMMING / LESSONS LEARNED:

The project is based on a number of key assumptions derived from an extensive literature review and lessons learned from peacebuilding processes in South Sudan and the region.

1. **Nexus programming requires more than just enhanced coordination between pillars:** In South Sudan, humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus programming is often just D programming with a small or intentional social cohesion (P) element. Furthermore, nexus programming often focuses on geographic areas that are considered to be conducive for such programming (i.e., "pockets of stability or peace") rather than the actual hotspots of violence where peace and development programming is most crucial. This project recognises that continuing to work in 3 silos (reconciliation, stabilisation, and resilience) with some enhanced coordination is not sustainable. As such, peace contributions are placed at the forefront of programme design, whereby all programming is based on two key questions: 1) Do the interventions support those communities or areas facing the highest levels of conflict; and 2) How can any given activity or intervention disincentivise violence and/or incentivise peace. Incremental gains which contribute to enhanced stability (if not peace) will help build a foundation for more expanded efforts to achieve positive peace, through complementary or sequential programming by project partners and other actors. Partners recognise the importance – and cost – of effective joint programming which means prioritising *strategic* coordination in areas where that is necessary over coordination for the sake of it, while also incentivising effective coordination. As such the M&E logframe will include an indicator on coordination for all partners.
2. **Situating dialogue in a process:** Dialogue events should only be supported if they are part of a systematic process with clear accountability mechanisms. There are myriad dialogue events across South Sudan on a regular basis. Often these are not situated as part of a longer-term process, with material support only provided by peace partners for specific peace dialogue events. Whatever monitoring mechanisms may be agreed in theory, in practice there are no resources for implementation and invariably the next dialogue will be in response to further violence, and so the cycle continues. At each stage of the Jonglei peacebuilding process, the more prominent milestones (the spear ceremony, the Rumbek Dialogue, the Pieri Conference) were necessary but insufficient engagements. Subsequent conflict dynamics in each case after the events that would likely have led to a larger mobilisation without the sustained engagement on the ground.
3. **Addressing historical memory:** Dialogue is more effective where there is a structured element of dealing with the past. Among all actors, there is a deep need for psycho-social support. This needs to include victims and perpetrators. One-off output-driven trauma healing workshops or trauma awareness training have limited results, unless it is linked to longer term engagement. These issues can be addressed, in small part, by situating truth-telling centrally in dialogue processes and creating space for personal experiences and impact to be shared. This can be sufficient for actors to move into a new phase of peacebuilding engagement, but does not fundamentally address the broader psycho-social needs. Symbolic reconciliation is also central, and needs to



happen through traditional practices and leadership. While the Greater Jonglei engagement has created some effective space for sharing the impact of conflict, and has also created important connection points for humanising the adversary, the full legacy of conflict remains largely unaddressed at this stage of the process. It has also become clear that the women often play a more natural role in the sharing of impact around conflict, whereas men tend to focus more on the attribution of blame. This underlines in yet another way the importance of creating spaces for women in the unfolding process.

4. **Taking a 'system' view of peace dividends and focussing on community priorities:** Progress in social relationships can only be sustainable with the realisation of substantive peace dividends, and the community may weigh factors in unexpected ways. In the follow-up to the Pieri Conference, for example, the centrality to confidence and trust building of the return of abducted women and children was categorical. In the popular narrative, the primacy of cattle to the communities is often emphasised. Yet since the Pieri Conference, it was clear that the ongoing return of women and children was perceived as a sufficient dividend to hold back agitation of youth to mobilise for raiding. Nonetheless, materially speaking, the armed youth leaders themselves have bluntly presented their dilemma: among other things, cattle raiding is key livelihood activity. In this sense, their commitment to peace is provisional and subject to visible signs of economic progress where they can see viable alternative livelihoods for themselves. The status of some youth leaders, derived from raiding, also needs to be factored into negotiations; they need to feel that future benefits are commensurate or superior to both the material and social capital they realise through raiding.
5. **Engaging those directly responsible for initiating violence:** The risks of engagement with armed actors need to be overcome. Lessons learned in peacebuilding work in Western Lakes and in Jonglei, found the prevailing narrative singularly describes armed youth leaders as criminals and perpetrators of human rights violations. Focusing on this dimension tends to characterise them as a problem to mitigate rather than exploring the possibility they could make a substantively positive contribution to the peace. In both contexts, and in most (but not all) individual cases, it was found that the line between violence-oriented choices and peace-oriented choices is more fluid than it is perceived externally, generally linked to an economic choice. There is agreement on the need to engage the key actors; too often this ends up being only the key actors we like.
6. **Working through traditional structures, practices and leadership:** Prioritising and valuing traditional conflict management mechanisms at the community level. There needs to be a locally-guided balance of tradition, modern religion and the modern state. Some have viewed this as mutual exclusive. The role of traditional, spiritual, and religious leaders in Jonglei peace processes all factored into community perceptions of peace initiatives, as well as the level of commitment to any agreements. Agreements need to identify the locally meaningful signs of commitment. These will rarely – if ever – involve a written document. Documents can be included as a supplement for a literate audience, but the traditional practices should be central; for example, spear ceremonies, the killing of the white bull, and so on. Processes need to mediate the diversity of these rituals and the associated belief systems. As the narrative of the Pieri Peace Conference in Jonglei shows, it was not substantive issues that proved the primary point of contention, but the ritual ceremonies themselves.
7. **Definitions of community are complex:** The language of custom and community tends to evoke positive associations of authenticity, belonging and harmony. It is important to recognise, however, that customs and communities can be defined in deeply exclusionary ways, creating or maintaining individual and structural forms of power and privilege. While much policy and analysis assume that ethnic communities are the basis of customary authority in South Sudan, the reality is more complicated. Therefore, defining communities and the rights accorded their members through the use of custom can be the basis not only for exclusion and conflict, but also for maintaining power and inequality within these communities. Moreover, the complexity of affiliation and identity across South Sudan demonstrates a continuing plurality of power. Considerations around the complexity of communities and the different roles that any one individual will have within his or her lifetime must form the basis of strategic sequencing of engagement with different actors and stakeholders in peace processes.
8. **Community outreach and engagement enhances support for activities and facilitates local ownership:** Local authorities and community members may obstruct the implementation of activities or may improve their impact and increase their sustainability when they take ownership in their implementation. Failure to inform and consult with communities and engage them in the activities has been shown to create unintended spoilers during implementation and create the impression that the processes are owned and decided by the UN, NGOs, and other entities. In contrast, sensitization, outreach and direct involvement of local authorities, like chiefs and Boma administrators, has shown to encourage cooperation and ownership of relevant tasks that facilitate the implementation of activities. Furthermore, outreach and sensitization, in some circumstances, may be more impactful and enhance local ownership when is undertaken directly by those working on project mechanisms, such as judicial actors serving on mobile courts, or government officials rather than directly by the consortium's international partners.
9. **Keeping the external politics at an appropriate distance:** Maintaining an authorising environment through engagement with elites and government; keeping them updated but maintaining ownership at the community level. The external politics are both enmeshed in the local dynamics and distant from it. Actors on the ground have encountered a growing realisation among armed actors that they have been instrumentalised by elites; in main towns, in Juba and in the diaspora. The local communities are now increasingly adamant that the process

- must be led at the community level, and this higher-level interference is strongly resisted. As described in the narrative above, previous experience has indicated both the power of the elites to sabotage activities, as well as the power of the local communities to ensure activities go ahead even with resistance from some elites.
10. **Learning from other relevant South Sudanese experiences and traditions:** Despite contextual differences there is value in sharing dialogue experiences across locations. Stakeholders have focused on distilling principles from different locations that can provide a lens for exploring similar issues elsewhere. That said, they recognise a key pitfall in wider peace programming: attempting to transpose a programme design directly from one location to another, and believing it is possible to short-cut the process for arriving at the design and neglecting the trust building steps that are indispensable to community ownership. Importantly, trust is not built through one-off 'community consultations' or 'participatory workshops' but through an iterative process of engagement among equals. Opportunities to share experiences across contexts have also proven useful.
  11. **Responding flexibly and rapidly as the context changes:** inflexible activity programming, often based on traditional logframe approaches, will invariably fail. The process of consolidating a negative peace is not complicated, but does require political engagement and ability to respond quickly to emerging opportunities. Whilst plenty of indications have been identified of what would not work, it was less clear what exactly will work. Ultimately, it is a question of sustained engagement and being ready to respond when an appropriate opportunity arises. Critically, each step of the engagement process itself acts as a function of the confidence and trust built, and should be identified by the interlocutors themselves, so cannot be pre-programmed. This may be seen by some as an outlier approach to peacebuilding programming, whereas stakeholders consider it should be more and more the essence of effective peacebuilding.
  12. **Crisis modifier requirement within the budget:** We can be confident, based on experience, that certain key elements of peace programming will contribute effectively to the management of conflict over time. At the same time, the effectiveness of these transversal mechanisms is subject to the wider dynamics. As such and based on lessons learned during similar programming in other contexts, consortium partners have recognized the need for a "rapid response fund" or "crisis modifier", since rigid funding may otherwise hinder the required agility for such a complex intervention in such a fluid context. Based on experience from Jonglei, examples of where such a "modifier" is necessary may include:
    - a. Sometimes there will be an **assumption that does not hold**. For example, we assumed in Jonglei / GPAA that there are dissemination mechanisms socially that will lead from a peace agreement signature by all relevant actors to broad acceptance at the community level - this assumption proved valid for Dinka and Nuer communities but invalid for the Murle. Once this flawed assumption surfaces, a pivot is needed to address it, otherwise the theory of change will not hold.
    - b. Sometimes there is a **dynamic that is not prioritised**, based on available information and that proves to be a mistake. This was the case with the inattention given to the Gawaar community at the outset of the Pieri process, which then required follow up intervention, especially after the subsequent attack against the GPAA. Without flexibility of funding modalities among some partners, this would not have been addressed.
    - c. Sometimes the basic programming is sound, but for certain issues the **resourcing is insufficient to properly complete a phase**. For example, a dialogue may be appropriately planned, prepared and facilitated but the nature of the issues is such that further time is needed. At times, a further 24-48 hours is enough to close out issues that would have otherwise been left hanging, potentially in a conflict insensitive manner, at the conclusion of the dialogue.
    - d. Sometimes it is an **external force undermining the activity**. For example, where despite best efforts, the start of a planned activity is forcibly delayed by non-community actors at a point where resources have been deployed. Whether the event is delayed temporarily or postponed, it won't be able to be completed within the same resource envelope.
  13. **Transparency and clarity with communities:** There is a high level of scepticism within communities towards externally led interventions. A significant element of this is a perception of historical unmet expectations and unkept promises. In some cases, the challenges in delivery are understandable, but too often actors don't take the time to communicate that message clearly back to the affected communities. As such, ensuring that communication with communities is clear about what is and is not possible, and wherever a commitment is made, following through on that commitment, is crucial to the success of peace interventions.
  14. **Working with trusted local partners:** Taking time to understand and triangulate the dynamics of the local actors, then working closely alongside those who can facilitate entry points. Lack of collaboration on the ground undermines progress. The territoriality that external actors often perceive amongst South Sudanese institutions is sometimes replicated between international peace partners. Without investment in collaboration with local partners, spiritual and traditional leaders, with State and National Government actors, the Ministry in Juba, and with other international agencies, the project's success will likely be undermined. A key frustration has been witnessing situations where another peace actor has not shared plans or has attempted an intervention that could be more effective through a collaborative approach. Much more can be achieved beyond simple information sharing, so that activities of different actors are mutually visible, but this minimum standard can avoid pitfalls in the wider process.

15. **Strengthening livelihoods groups and institutions to ensure better market linkages:** Existing resilience projects focused on strengthening backward and forward market linkages of for smallholders have highlighted the importance of strengthening informal livelihoods groups as well as rural institutions (like farmer's organisations). Informal livelihood groups have emerged as critical sources of material support and wellbeing within Tonj's rural communities. These groups have become especially important to the abilities of their members to cope and adapt during crisis, particularly when displacement weakens kinship networks and the reliability and extent of support between kin. In addition to the economic benefits that these groups offer their members, those who have to travel outside of their displacement areas (such as women and traders) also benefit from the safety, protection, shared trust, and information that these groups offer. By targeting such groups for resilience, reconciliation, and stabilization activities, different components of the project can also strengthen one another. Strengthening rural institutions allows for enhanced sustainability of implementation capacity from which the State Ministry of Agriculture and other development actors can draw to expand the activities beyond this project (period, thematic area and geography) to other areas.
16. **Multiple adoption of climate-smart agriculture innovations increases resilience of smallholder farmers to climate change:** Conservation agriculture, flood tolerant upland rice, cassava and improved legume varieties are key climate change management strategies for smallholder farmers in Tonj and South Sudan. Their complementary efforts in adaptation to climate change are sternly important for farm productivity and income. ADRA rice, cassava and legumes pilot elucidate individual and multiple adoption of climate change management strategies and their differential impacts on productivity and income. ADRA will employ a multiple adoption of innovation strategy which has helped smallholder farmers' access key resources (credit, income and information), level of agriculture education and water & land conservation and use by the farmer. More so, the concurrent adoption of conservation agriculture, stress adapted legume varieties, flood and or drought tolerant upland rice and cooperative farming approach (through farmers' association and aggregation center) has far greater dividends on productivity and income than when considered individually. However, impacts of multiple adoption of the practices are not entirely uniform across different geographic regions and gender. Results suggest that effective institutional and policy efforts targeted towards reducing resource constraints that inhibit farmers' capacity to adopt complementary climate-smart agriculture packages such as conservation agriculture, drought tolerant rice and improved legume varieties must be gender sensitive and context specific.

#### 9. CONSORTIUM RECIPIENT ORGANISATIONS / IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS:

**Peace Canal:** Peace Canal is a national NGO that builds on the work of the Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund, a UK-funded program aimed at targeted communities becoming more harmonious and resilient to conflict, as well as strengthening and supporting more inclusivity of political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions that are key for handling conflict and establishing the conditions for sustained peace. In Lakes State, the work is concentrated on the relationships between the five sub-sections of the Dinka Agar and supporting mechanisms for peaceful relations between them. Importantly, Peace Canal focusses on engagements with the *gelweng* youth leaders and in the cattle camps. The role of those in town is an important dimension that we are building on further as the work continues, while still preserving this emphasis on the rural communities. In Greater Jonglei and Pibor, the engagement initially focused on the relationships between the Murle, Dinka Bor and Lou Nuer, primarily through the armed youth and traditional leadership. This continues, also building to ensure that the Lou Gawaar are fully part of the ongoing peace process. It is also giving more emphasis to the relationships within these three communities, where further work is needed to deal with the legacy of past conflict. The comparative experience in these two contexts provides a rich foundation for supporting an enhanced approach alongside TOCH in the specific context of Greater Tonj.

**TOCH:** The Organization for Children's Harmony (TOCH) was formed in 2008 after a group of youths was alarmed by the impact of inter-communal violence and subsequent insecurity that devastated lives and livelihoods further affecting children and women. TOCH is legally registered by the South Sudan Ministry of Justice, as well as the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). TOCH has successfully delivered projects on peacebuilding, conflict management, and community security as well as child protection and GBV in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes, and the Abyei Administrative Area. For the last 13 years of progressive work, TOCH has entered into a partnership with up to 11 funding agencies, including four UN agencies, supporting projects under four thematic areas: Peacebuilding and Community Security, Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL), Protection (CP & GBV), and Education. At present, TOCH has established functional offices and competent staff in Tonj North County (Warrap town), Tonj South County (Tonj town), and Tonj East (Paliang). In addition, TOCH also has offices in Yiroi, Rumbek, Kuajok, Aweil, and its Head Office in Juba. TOCH has a total number of 70 employees (both program and support staff) spread across these areas with different expertise that cut across its thematic areas and sound policies that guide its programme and resource management. TOCH has a strong reputation and good working relationships with communities, local authorities, and the national government. TOCH is currently the Co-Chair for GBV and

Protection Sub-Cluster and a leading member of the Peace Actors Forum in Warrap State. This is in addition to national CSOs coalitions and alliances.<sup>4</sup>

- ➔ **Transfers and grants:** The choice to partner with Dotbaai Women Initiative is both programmatic and strategic as it is meant to achieve double impact of building women capacity to undertake peacebuilding and using Dotbaai strategic standing in the community to break some of the traditional deadlocks. As such, TOCH will sub-grant a portion of its funds to Dotbaai. This women-led community based organization has worked closely with TOCH in the past to break some of the most difficult deadlocks in conflict resolution. The sub-granting to Dotbaai Women group is also part of TOCH's peacebuilding strategy to empower women to lead peacebuilding in greater Tonj and to build locally-led initiatives to be championed by women. The sub-granting will be preceded by Dotbaai capacity assessment of its institutional, managerial and programmatic capacity to identify strengths and gaps that need to be enhanced through TOCH's mentorship. After this assessment, a formal grant agreement will be drawn and signed before the fund is transferred. The transfer will be on three instalments for the year 2022, 2023 and 2024.

UNMISS maintains a field office in Warrap State that has a vast understanding of the operational context in greater Tonj and extensive experience in the protection of civilians, peacebuilding, stabilisation and rule of law, as well as the provision of basic social services dating from the pre-independence period. All UNMISS Sections, including the good office of the HOFO, will engage and coordinate together to prevent duplication, increase effectiveness, accountability and economies of scale among partners. UNMISS Civil Affairs Division will utilize its wealth of institutional memory and in-depth knowledge of the historical, social, and political dynamics that affect conflict within the state, as well as its established and robust relationships with the Warrap political, social, military and security actors across the state and region, including civil society and non-government stakeholders to inform and advance project objectives. The UNMISS Police Component (UNPOL) will support the stabilization component of the project through its ongoing capacity building training workshops, co-location and mentoring of SSNPS officers in all counties, and will support the establishment and operationalization of PCRCs UNMISS Human Rights Division (HRD) will support early warning and response efforts by integrating its human rights monitoring activities i. HRD's long presence in Warrap state (before and after independence) has provided it with an in-depth understanding of the community dynamics and the reality of human rights in Greater Tonj. HRD's relationships with local NGOs, CBOs, and human rights defenders in communities across greater Tonj will help facilitate the establishment of community legal aid schemes and paralegal networks. UNMISS Rule of Law Advisory Section (RoLAS) supports the national and sub-national justice and security actors to restore and reform the rule of law and justice sector, in a conflict sensitive manner, to strengthen the protection of civilians, combat impunity and promote accountability. RoLAS's considerable experience in implementing stabilization activities related to rule of law and accountability in RSRTF supported projects in WBEG and Warrap States, Koch, and Jonglei/GPAA, will help to ensure the success of the stabilisation interventions in this project, including through its continued engagements with local authorities, traditional leaders, judges, prosecutors, investigators, prison officials, defence lawyers, Revitalized Marial Bai Committee members and psycho-social support providers in Greater Tonj. UNMISS Protection, Transition and Reintegration Section (PTR) is the interface between UNMISS and partners (humanitarian and development actors). This work with actors and stakeholders under the political, humanitarian/development domain and with the community will help to foster the triple-nexus approach that the project aims to adopt.

- ➔ **Transfers and grants:** Limited amounts have been budgeted for transfers/grants to counterparts for stabilisation activities to the Bridge Network (to conduct justice perception assessments) and CSOs/CBOs to support community paralegal networks on a short-term basis (6 months). These grants are intended for specific activities, in specific areas, for a shorter time period than the project. In light of the limited duration and scope of the grants, the engagement of UNDP (as the fund recipient) is essential to ensure overall coherence of implemented activities, and therefore does not serve simply as a pass-through. Subcontracting arrangements will follow established UNDP procedures for such transfers and grants.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):** UNDP supports South Sudan's national and subnational actors to rebuild a culture of rule of law and respect for human rights supported by just institutions to enable sustainable

<sup>4</sup> TOCH and Peace Canal and CAD have complementary roles. TOCH is deeply embedded in the local context, with the explicit and tacit understanding, as well as relationships, to guide the process on the ground. Peace Canal brings technical and coordination experiences of similar approaches in Lakes and Jonglei / GPAA, and some broader strategic focus to complement the contextual focus of TOCH. UNMISS CAD will focus primarily on the interface with government, as well as also drawing its own experiences from across contexts. These are three complementary contributions to the reconciliation pillar, each naturally with associated overheads. Finally, having two national peacebuilding actors in addition to CAD is meant to ensure sustainability of the programme at the end of the RSRTF and forms part of the exit strategy, to empower local NGOs to continue in the area as we exit the programme.

peace and development. Working closely with the rest of the UN system, UNDP supports national partners to address security and justice through a people-centred, sector wide and human rights-based approach, to nurture public participation and trust, and to expand access to justice and ensure community security, especially for women, youth, persons with disabilities, marginalized groups and displaced communities. An important part of this work is reforming laws and building capacity of justice and law enforcement institutions to become inclusive and accountable.<sup>5</sup>

**World Food Programme (WFP):** WFP maintains ongoing interventions in all 78 counties of South Sudan. Activities include emergency programming in the unconditional provision of food, cash, and nutrition assistance as well as resilience-building activities involving conditional in-kind and cash transfers, support to schools through School Feeding, and the maintenance and construction of enabling infrastructure like trunk road rehabilitation. WFP's key strategic advantages include:

- While WFP is not a peacebuilding agency itself, it seeks to explicitly contribute to peace and address root drivers of organised violence in South Sudan, acknowledging that conflict is the greatest risk to food security and livelihoods.
- WFP's field experience in South Sudan shows the ability to partner effectively with local authorities, cooperating partners and government social service structures.
- WFP has been the Government's key technical partner since 2014 in reaching especially crucial places where violence and insecurity make access to those in need a constant challenge through its RRM modality.
- Capitalizing on WFP's local and global resources, WFP has the know-how and technical expertise in Community-Based Participatory Planning (CBPP) approaches and strengthening communities' own resilience-building efforts and development to provide the entry point to achieve set objectives.

The opportunities afforded by adopting a comprehensive approach to work across the humanitarian, development and peace spectrum, will allow WFP to leverage its presence, tools and experience to implement a contextually appropriate sustainable and holistic response. WFP has operational presence in all intervention areas, with over 100 intervention sites and 13 implementing partners in Warrap state, supporting a variety of interventions including General Food Distribution (GFD), curative and preventative nutrition programmes, Food Assistance for Assets (FFA), and school feeding.

- **Transfers and grants:** 75% of WFP interventions are implemented or supported by Cooperating Partners (CPs), through a 'Field Level Agreement' (FLA), whereby funds are transferred to the NGOs for implementing a specific activity. The benefit of such arrangements are that programmatic coherence and quality can be maintained across all project locations country wide, as well as linked up to ensure impact at higher and wider (geographic) levels. For this project, FLAs will be developed for a cooperating partner to implement Food for Assets (FFA) activities and the existing FLA with the Bridge Network will be amended for the continued implementation of the Measuring Safety and Security (MSS) methodology. Payment is made to the partners after verifying that the activities have been completed in accordance with terms and conditions of the FLA. WFP also closely monitor the activities through its own monitoring systems and build partner's capacity as required. Partners for implementation of activities are selected through a competitive process, which ensures that the partner most suited and providing best value is used for implementation. The FLAs are established through a transparent process using UN Partner Portal. This approach gives WFP the flexibility to select multiple partners if required, e.g., in situation when one partner do not have the required capacity or geographical coverage.

**ADRA:** ADRA is a faith-based humanitarian organisation of the Seventh day Adventist church, operating in over 130 countries, which support one another through provision of financial and human resources, including technical backstopping. ADRA South Sudan has been present in country since 1994 and is registered with the government. The organization's portfolio includes Food Security and Livelihoods, Education, Emergency management and Health with its presence spread in five of the former ten States. ADRA South Sudan has gained experience in managing relief and resilience building, Climate Smart Food Security, and livelihoods projects. Cross-cutting issues in ADRA's

<sup>5</sup> The complementarity between UNMISS and UNDP is designed into the project. While UNDP is the intended grant recipient, all rule of law/stabilisation activities are expected to be implemented in a joint, integrated manner, utilizing each organisation's comparative advantages. This integrated approach will be achieved through:

(a) Co-location - all project staff for the justice/rule of law component will work together in the same office on the UNMISS compound. Both organizations will contribute complementary technical expertise (UNMISS through existing justice, police, and corrections experts and UNDP through national and international technical experts hired under this programme) to ensure a coherent and integrated response.

(b) Integrated programme implementation - activities will rely heavily upon the existing presence and relationships established by RoLAS and UNMISS more broadly in Warrap State while utilizing UNDP's programming and technical expertise and more flexible funding mechanisms.

While all activities will be implemented jointly, UNDP will receive and be responsible for processing all funds under the UNMISS/UNDP budget. This approach has been adopted to limit overhead costs and ensure timely programme implementation, as UNDP funding procedures are better adapted to be able to implement large-scale programmes of this type.

programming include environment protection, gender parity, peace building and child protection. ADRA implements projects in Warrap, Upper Nile, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, and the Abyei Administrative Area. ADRA South Sudan's FSL projects have been funded by WFP, LDS, CFGB and BMZ as well as the ADRA Network fund. Additional technical support to the ADRA Network includes Technical Learning Labs (TLL), which provide technical support for the development of strategies and policies for specific sectors and tools for data collection and monitoring. In line with this call, ADRA South Sudan receives backing from the Resilient and Livelihoods TTLs. ADRA also has a competent staff contingency that can be located in the target counties with the capacity to effectively implement resilience programming. Particularly in Tonj South and Kuajok field offices, ADRA has adequate staff accommodation, offices, and vehicles. ADRA has clear policies and procedures to deal with PSEA, Child Protection, fraud, conflict of interest and has a well communicated Complaints and Feedback mechanism.

#### 10.MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING:

Project partners will take a four-pronged approach to the monitoring and evaluation of planned interventions. First, consortium partners will be establishing an M&E working group to elaborate the M&E Plan (Annex B), develop the necessary tools, and establish timelines for all M&E activities, including the baseline of outcome and output indicators for which no data exists. Consortium partners are aware that the complexity of implementing a project of this scale is matched by the complexity of measuring partners' and project performance. In particular, cause-and-effect relationships will often be uncertain, contextual factors will continuously influence programming, new opportunities and new needs will continue to arise, and the pace of change is unpredictable. As such, the M&E approaches set out below are designed to be complexity aware, so that unintended outcomes, alternative explanations and relations, and regular feedback loops are highlighted and considered.

The baseline will be established within the first three months of community-level activity implementation, from which progress against outcome level indicators identified in Annex A will be tracked periodically.

Second, indicators developed according to the Measuring Safety and Security (MSS) methodology, developed by WFP in coordination with Naomi Pendle for the Jonglei ABP, will be used to measure target communities' perceptions of safety and security in relation to the impact of project interventions. MSS is particularly suited to the protracted nature of conflict in the context of greater Tonj, where programming and M&E are taking place sometimes during episodes of organised violence. MSS draws on a combination of qualitative, ethnographic and quantitative tools. In January 2022, with funding from Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), WFP partnered with Naomi Pendle and the Bridge Network, a consortium of South Sudanese researchers, to roll out MSS in hotspots payams in all three counties of greater Tonj. The data collection for the development of MSS indicators has been finalised and the analysis and selection of indicators is in its' final stage, with the indicator report expected to be finalised in early April. The other steps of the MSS methodology, including baseline, progress, and endline measurement and project ethnographies have been funded through BMZ until the end of 2022 and, as such, this project will only be required to fund the monthly project ethnographies from January 2023 until June 2024.

Third, WFP in May 2022 will conduct a multi-dimensional social networks analysis, similarly funded by BMZ, through the deployment of internally developed software in greater Tonj with a 'pseudo-recall' question that serves to illustrate how communities in greater Tonj' network structures have been affected by recent years of conflict and displacement. Based on the outcomes of this analysis, project partners will be using an experimental design with the network structure as an outcome variable to understand how this project is promoting (or hindering) certain network qualities which represent better social cohesion outcomes.

Fourth, a study will be conducted on community perceptions of justice in greater Tonj. This study will complement engagements undertaken in coordination with the reconciliation pillar during Phase I to clarify community priorities, including requests for courts, special courts, and mobile courts that have emerged in recent resolutions and communiqués; by providing an understanding of what providers have historically and are now providing justice for grievances that can cause or are related to conflict; the factors determining whether these actions are accepted by parties and communities as adequate; and when and why current legal institutions and norms satisfy or fail to satisfy demands for justice. In addition to informing stabilisation programming under this and future projects, this study will be used as a baseline for stabilisation interventions, and perceptions will be monitored periodically throughout the project cycle.

WFP will utilize its twice-per year post-distribution monitoring (PDM) survey to collect data to measure outcome and output level indicators as well MSS, social network indicators, and perceptions of justice. Monthly process monitoring will also be conducted to track status of activity implementation and outputs. Overall M&E activities and generated results will be conducted by all project partners and coordinated by WFP, while community level monitoring will be undertaken by community-led project oversight teams, who will be trained in data collection methods.

Furthermore, learning "workshops" are foreseen in the budget and will allow for regular channels of exchange on the various results and reports coming from the different M&E approaches, which are all conducted on different timelines (from monthly ethnographic diaries to bi-annual surveys). These workshops will allow for regular and in-depth engagement between consortium partners, Area Reference Group members, and external stakeholders such as government and community representatives to discuss what is working and what not and what level of adaption is required. The specifics of this element of learning will evolve further during the inception phase.

Finally, the RSRTF will commission an independent end-of-programme evaluation of the ABP which will be conducted in the last quarter of the programme. The main goals of this evaluation will be (i) to assess the performance and impact of the ABP, and (ii) to reflect on the validity, relevance, and effectiveness of the RSRTF's approach to area-based programming. The Project Coordination Team (incl. the Coordinator and M&E officer), as well as relevant consortium partner M&E staff and project managers will actively support this evaluation, including through providing feedback throughout the design and implementation of the evaluation, forming an evaluating committee, providing logistical support and facilitating field work where necessary, and supporting other evaluation activities as required.

11. RISKS & MITIGATIONS:

Threat	Indicators of Change	Vulnerability (Who, What, When, from Whom)	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation and Contingency	Residual Risk after M&C	RR Acceptable? (Y / N)
COVID-19	Increase of cases; ongoing and/or increased movement restrictions.	Who: Coronavirus/COVID-19. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Person to person transmission. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Dependent upon rates of community spread, global transmission rates, community adherence to protective measures, availability of PPE.	An increase in COVID-19 cases would further limit travel, contact, group meetings, project implementation, and possibly the availability of goods and services.	Social distancing and other preventative measures to be always followed (e.g., face masks, hand washing stations). As a project partner, WHO will advise on mitigation and contingency on an ongoing basis.	Moderate. This risk is not program-specific and as such is now a condition of the operating environment, however, the risk to vulnerable individuals may be Critical, to include death.	Yes, unless infection rates rise significantly. Given conditions of famine and near famine, it may be necessary for WFP to continue operations in these areas even in such an eventuality.
Misalignment between RSRTF and government approaches	Spoilers try to influence or manipulate programming; disarmament or "conflict reduction exercises" exacerbate conflict dynamics	Who: Military or political elites Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Manipulation, capture, sabotage; disarmament, heavy handed security responses When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Dependent on success of political engagement strategy; pre-election political dynamics; modus operandi planned disarmament exercises	Impact will be determined by level of elite involvement/manipulation and geographical scope of involvement.	Consistent and effective government engagement and advocacy; monitoring of conditions to take precautionary measures, to include delays in implementation if necessary.	Moderate. The political engagement strategy is designed in such a way as to mitigate opportunities for elite capture, manipulation, or sabotage and government interventions leading to escalated violence would present the most risk to Phase 2, as projects may need to be stopped before completion or subject to destruction in the case of escalated cycles of violence.	Yes, as programming needs in greater Tonj are urgent and violence levels in the regions are already high.
High levels of national-level violence	Breakdown and/or failure of the peace agreement; UNMISS reporting on higher levels of national (political) violence.	Who: National political factions and respective armed entities. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: General violence (war), targeted killings. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Political stalemates and failure to successfully negotiate implementation of the peace agreement would increase the likelihood.	The scale and spread of such violence would have significant programming impact across the UN system.	Monitoring of conditions to take precautionary measures, to include delays in implementation if necessary.	Minor. Phase II implementation of the project would be most at risk in such a case, as projects may need to be stopped before completion or subject to destruction in the case of an outbreak of war.	Yes, as programming needs in greater Tonj are urgent and violence levels in the regions are already high.



Threat	Indicators of Change	Vulnerability (Who, What, When, from Whom)	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation and Contingency	Residual Risk after M&C	RR Acceptable? (Y / N)
High levels of localised violence, to include violence instigated by regional and/or national actors	UNMISS reporting on higher levels of national (political) violence.	Who: Local political factions and respective armed entities; armed youth groups. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Armed conflict and crime, targeted killings, revenge killings. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Further breakdowns of leadership and governance roles and responsibilities; political breakdowns; desperation of population.	Impact will be determined by geographical scope of violence, and frequency.	Monitoring of conditions to take precautionary measures, to include delays in implementation if necessary.	Moderate. Phase II implementation of the project would be most at risk in such a case, as projects may need to be stopped before completion or subject to destruction in the case of escalated cycles of violence.	Yes, as programming needs in greater Tonz are urgent and violence levels in the regions are already high.
Extreme levels of food insecurity	WFP reporting on food security.	Who: Community members. Whom: Community members. What: Natural scarcity and/or scarcity resulting from man-made causes. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Violence and natural disasters will increase the likelihood of food scarcity.	Extreme food scarcity may have an impact on the physical and psychological ability of community members to engage in project activities.	Food provision will be undertaken by WFP in connection with the project.	Minor, as WFP programming should address the most urgent needs.	Yes, the intervention will help address the risk.
Logistical constraints (e.g., impassable roads, flooding)	UNMISS, WFP and partner reporting on conditions.	Who: National disasters compounded by inadequate disaster response capabilities. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Rain, erosion. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	These conditions are highly likely as they characterise the environment.	Project activities may be significantly delayed or difficult to implement.	Programming will be scheduled to avoid high-risk times (e.g., rainy season) and conditions will be monitored.	Moderate. Logistical constraints may increase costs associated with transport as well as project implementation.	Yes, the obstacles may delay and make programming more difficult, but this is an acceptable risk.
Delayed salary payments to civil servants	Rule of law/civil servants on the ground report that salary payments are not made	Who: State level rule of law actors (police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers) Whom: National elites	As challenges with civil servant salaries is a national issue, it is highly-likely to	Decreased morale and delayed salaries may have an impact on physical and	Ongoing engagements by partners at the national level – including advocacy with national rule	Moderate. Support offered by the programme in the form of daily field allowances may help to offset delayed salaries and serve as motivation for rule of law actors to	Yes, the obstacles may make programming more difficult, but this is an acceptable risk.

<p>and/or continue to be delayed</p> <p>Political and military elites incite violence to undermine progress of RSR TF activities</p> <p>Information from ground and Juba signal weak concerns raised by military or political elites; day to day movements impeded by political or military leaders and subordinates.</p>	<p>What: Decreased morale from lack of payment of salaries</p> <p>When: 24/7</p> <p>Where: All locations</p> <p>Who: local communities and program itself</p> <p>From whom: military and political actors</p> <p>What: Restriction of movement, attacks against program activities, mobilisation of communities against each other.</p> <p>When: 24/7</p> <p>Where: All locations</p>	<p>continue throughout programming</p> <p>Significant</p>	<p>psychological ability of rule of law actors and other servants to engage in project activities</p> <p>Severe</p>	<p>of law actors and public financial management reforms</p> <p>Actor mapping and close relationship management and response where weak signals of interference or incitement to violence are picked up.</p>	<p>participate in the project activities</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Yes</p>
<p>Conflict response and accountability mechanisms are not sufficiently resilient to survive beyond the lifespan of the program</p> <p>Phase-out conversations with community leadership and government</p> <p>Violence spills over from across borders of targeted areas and threatens progress within the targeted areas</p>	<p>Who: local communities</p> <p>From whom: government and local communities</p> <p>What: de-operationalisation of conflict resolution mechanisms</p> <p>When: end of program.</p> <p>Where: All locations</p>	<p>High</p> <p>Moderate</p>	<p>Severe</p>	<p>Engaging stakeholder groups from early stages of the implementation (from 9 month mark) on sustainability conversations and needs.</p> <p>Establishment of coordination and communication with cross-border peace actors to identify emerging risks and attempt to prevent or reduce the impact of potential attacks</p>	<p>Moderate</p> <p>Project activities may be significantly delayed or difficult to implement.</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Yes.</p>

<p><b>Cropping adaptation and genetic improvement:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Seasonal planning/ timing of cropping</li> <li>2. Introducing early maturing seed varieties of sorghum;</li> <li>3. Intercropping</li> <li>4. Genetic improvement of existing crop varieties.</li> <li>5. Access to seasonal weather and climate information and disaster risk reduction structures (DRR) established in communities</li> <li>6. Construction of flood control Assets</li> </ol>	<p>These conditions are highly likely as they characterise the environment</p> <p>Crop failure, food insecurity &amp; food scarcity; compound conflicts;</p>	<p>Who: Community members          Whom: Community members          What: floods/ drought          Crop failure, food scarcity and/or scarcity resulting from natural/ climate change causes.          When: rain season/ harvest.          Where: All locations.</p>	<p>WFP and partner reporting on conditions</p> <p>Natural Disasters (Flood/ drought)</p>	<p>Moderate. The effects of floods increase with associated with food insecurity, vulnerability and stall development. Logistical constraints stall programming</p> <p>Yes, the intervention will help address the risk</p>
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## 12. MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS:

The management and coordination arrangements for this project will be developed to ensure coherence within the implementation of the project and enhanced coordination between project partners and interventions carried out by other relevant stakeholders and actors. As lead organisation, WFP will hire a Project Coordinator, who will be supported full time by a MEAL officer and an IMO officer. Together, they will form the Coordination Team.

An Area Reference Group (ARG) will be established to identify, promote, and facilitate effective and accountable interventions by sharing information, coordinating technical and financial assistance, and creating vertical and horizontal linkages with government institutions and non-state actors. The ARG's primary responsibilities will be:

- Providing a central coordinating forum for core partners to facilitate joint planning and oversight of activity implementation and to ensure continued coherence and collective monitoring of progress and lessons learned.
- Serving as a forum for referral and reference with other key stakeholders, including relevant UN Agencies, national and international NGOs, civil society and community-based organisations, national and sub-national authorities, and other experts.
- Enhancing accountability, mainstreaming, and effectiveness of reconciliation, stabilisation, and resilience-related interventions and engagement in greater Tonj.

The complexity and sensitivity of the subject matter requires selected technical membership and active involvement of and close collaboration project implementing partners and other relevant governmental, inter- and non-governmental agencies and institutions dealing with any or all aspects of violence in greater Tonj. Membership in the Area Reference Group will be divided into four categories:

- Core members, consisting of fund recipient partners plus implementing partners
- Strategic partners who are not direct recipients but where relationships of dependency have been identified
- Representatives from community-led project oversight teams
- Ad hoc members who shall be invited to attend meetings and coordinate as required, including local authorities and representatives from local communities and representatives of organizations present locally who have significant experience of implementing programmes in the area or other selected peacebuilding, conflict, and recovery experts that may provide relevant lessons and expertise to contribute to the overall achievements of the funded interventions.

The ARG will be chaired by the Project Coordinator, with support from other Coordination Team members. The ARG will meet online once a month and in person every quarter. Three sub-groups will be formed under the ARG structure for the three different pillars: Reconciliation (led by Peace Canal), Stabilisation (led by UNMISS), and Resilience (led by WFP). The sub-groups will meet as often as required to ensure coordination within and across pillars, as well as with other existing coordination mechanisms (i.e., the Tonj Peace Forum, the Warrap Rule of Law forum, and the Warrap State Resilience platform). Partners recognise the importance -- and cost -- of effective joint programming which means prioritising strategic coordination in areas where that is necessary over coordination for the sake of it. As such, much of the coordination at sub-ARG and sub-state level will be determined based on the outcomes of Phase 1, the level of activity, and the location of specific activities. Based on lessons from other contexts, partners will prioritize more effective and regular communication through platforms such as skype or whatsapp at the sub-county level to ensure real-time management and coordination which allow emerging issues to be addressed and programming to pivot where required. This will be particularly the case in areas in Tonj East and Tonj North, for example, where even in-person meetings at county headquarters level would have considerable transaction costs. At the same time, this will be an explicit agenda item for each quarterly ARG meeting, so that coordination mechanisms at county level can be reviewed and iterated where required.

A Project Board will be established, including senior level management representatives from each partner organisation. This Board will ensure senior-level strategic engagement of implementing partners and key stakeholders to ensure effective and accountable interventions and support high-level political engagement when required. The Board will also act as referral mechanisms for disputes or other issues that cannot be resolved at the ARG level.

For a detailed organigram, please see Annex F.

## 13. PROGRAMME SUSTAINABILITY / EXIT STRATEGY:

Project partners recognize that two years are likely not enough to ensure sustained positive peace in greater Tonj. The proposal therefore focuses on immediate and incremental contributions to negative peace which are achievable by focusing on grassroots levels of violence which would effectively raise the cost for mobilization. Nevertheless, since partners recognize that the RSRTF programme will eventually come to an end, it is crucial that the project's conclusion is planned and executed in a sensitive manner. To do so, the exit strategy will be designed to be flexible enough to address changes in conflict dynamics, and proactive enough to ensure beneficiaries' expectations are not unduly raised. To maintain a balance between proactive planning and flexibility, partners will develop a menu of

exit strategies through extensive consultation in Phase 1, that will be reviewed throughout project implementation against the updated conflict analysis and regular monitoring. As the end of the intervention nears, the most appropriate exit strategy will be chosen. Early development of a variety of exit strategies will help to ensure that the eventual exit has been well thought out; is effectively communicated (along with other possible strategies and their associated triggers) at every stage of the project to minimise unrealistic expectations by staff and beneficiaries; and responds to the conflict dynamics identified through the updated conflict analysis. While the menu may create some ambiguity, this is a price worth paying to ensure that beneficiaries and others are prepared for the exit when it comes.

Some elements of sustainability have nevertheless already been foreshadowed in this proposal, particularly relating to community design and ownership and capacity building.

The exact elements of the project will be designed through extensive community participation by partners actively working on the ground. Through consultations, a wide range of actors and experiences will be engaged throughout Phase 0 and 1. Throughout implementation, target populations will constitute active partners rather than passive recipients. This will be achieved through applying a participatory approach and holding regular consultations to reflect the needs, resources, and concerns of beneficiaries, in order to increase local ownership, buy-in, and best ensure sustainability. The intervention will be implemented with the community at the core of programming whilst maintaining close collaboration with the local administration, as well as national and international partners where appropriate. Gains made may positively impact higher level layers of violence over time, but also help build a foundation for more expanded efforts to achieve positive peace, through complementary or sequential programming by project partners and other peace, development, and humanitarian actors. Sustainability itself will also be discussed with communities and government from the early stages of the program, to move towards a sufficient level of community ownership such that systems can be maintained following RSRTF. This will also include conversations around necessary resourcing. For example, one strategy that cannot be pre-empted, but variations of which will be explored, is the link between progress in resilience and livelihoods and the sustainability of non-income generating peace mechanisms. For instance, community partnership agreements could foreshadow that beyond a certain threshold, a percentage of income from successful livelihood activities is directed towards the maintenance of conflict/peace management structures.

Through the program interventions, components of capacity building have been factored in for all stakeholders involved, thus creating the needed capacity for sustaining the efforts once the RSRTF activities end. While the project foreshadows several capacity building interventions, partners believe that the exact design and shaping of those interventions must be informed by a deeper understanding of existing capacities and gaps which will become apparent through Phase 1, as well as during the project's implementation. Furthermore, partners recognize the importance of sustained engagement with the same people on the issues that matter to them, as it is often more about how to incentivize good governance, rule of law, or equitable conflict resolution, rather than lack of capacity on how to do so.

**ANNEX A: IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PROGRAMME PROPOSAL RESULTS  
FRAMEWORK**

Included in separate Annex.

## ANNEX B: M&amp;E PLANNING TEMPLATE

1. List all the programme indicators
2. Select type of indicator, i.e., output or outcome indicator
3. Describe the indicator, e.g., what exactly, how the data will be collected, target beneficiaries, etc.
4. Indicate the source of data is recorded in
5. Indicate how often or timeline of the data to be collected
6. Indicate persons responsible for data availability
7. Current progress.

Indicators	Type of indicator	Indicator description	Data source	Baseline	Target	Frequency	Respon party
<b>Outcome 1</b>							
Percentage of individual respondents reporting increased personal safety and security in the target area in 'x time period'.	Outcome	Indicators designed using the MSS methodology	WFP bi-annual post-distribution monitoring (PDM) surveys	PDM in April 2022	TBD	Bi-annually	WFP
Number of UNMISS patrols conducted, by location and patrol type.	Output		UNMISS Patrol reports	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	
Number of safety and security/conflict monitoring activities conducted and reports disseminated to inform advocacy and programmatic direction	Output		MSS indicators and ethnographic diaries	TBD	TBD	Bi-annually	
Number of instances when political engagement and opportunities to leverage political influence are used to resolve conflicts / reduce tensions.	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	
Number of intra- / inter-communal dialogue sessions conducted	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	88	Quarterly	
Number of peaceful cattle restitution events completed	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	8	Quarterly	
<b>Outcome 2</b>							
Number of instances where disputes referred to community-based conflict management mechanisms supported in the target area were successfully mediated.	Outcome		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	115	Quarterly	
Proportion of community peace agreements and conflict management mechanisms	Outcome		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	40	Quarterly	

mediated/led by women and youth.								
Number of communities (payams) with functional mechanisms for conflict prevention, dialogue and conflict resolution.	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	23	Quarterly		
Number of conflict management, prevention, and resolution activities that broaden the space for women's leadership in peace processes and actively reinforce their role as agents of peace.	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	TBD	Quarterly		
Number of conflict management, prevention, and resolution activities that broaden the space for youth leadership in peace processes and actively reinforce their role as agents of peace.	Output		Peace Canal, TOCH, CAD reporting	TBD	TBD	Quarterly		
<b>Outcome 3</b>								
Number of reported cases including serious human rights violations such as SGBV that are investigated and prosecuted receiving judgment in the formal justice system.	Outcome	Number of cases receiving judgement or resolved through mechanism(s) supported by the project (disaggregated by gender)	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	0	TBD	Quarterly		UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Percentage of individuals expressing confidence in the police.	Outcome	Percentage of individuals expressing confidence in police in localities where project establishes PCRCS and/or constructs/ rehabilitates rule of law infrastructure (disaggregated by gender)	Perception Survey	TBD	TBD	Annually		UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Number of individuals provided with legal aid services disaggregated by gender	Output	Number of individuals who receive legal advice from community legal aid schemes and paralegal networks established by the project (disaggregated by gender)	Monthly reports from Paralegal CSOs	TBD	TBD	Quarterly		UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Number of SGBV survivors benefitting from victim redress mechanisms, including on transitional justice.	Output	Number of individuals who are referred to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms by community paralegal networks established by the project (disaggregated by gender)						
Number of mobile courts deployed	Output	Number of deployments of accountability mechanism(s) supported by the project	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	0	TBD	Quarterly		UNMISS ROL/U A2J



Number of cases investigated and adjudicated by the mobile courts deployed	Output	Number of cases investigated and adjudicated by accountability mechanism(s) supported by the project	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	0	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Number of justice sector facilities (traditional and formal) constructed, renovated, and/or equipped	Output	Number of rule of law infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated under the project (disaggregated by type)	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	0	9	Annually	UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Number of police and community relationship committees established and operational at community level	Output	Number of PCRCs established or supported by the project	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	0	5	Quarterly	UNMISS ROL/L UNDP
Number of justice chain actors trained disaggregated by gender and type of support/training (police, prosecutors, prison and judicial personnel)	Output	Number of informal and formal rule of law actors participating in events/engagements supported by the project (disaggregated by gender and professional category or function)	Attendance sheets; training reports	0	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS ROL/U A2J
Number of community representatives including youth and women specific clusters trained on community security approach and action planning	Output	Number of individuals participating/engaging in events held by PCRCs established or supported by the project (disaggregated by gender and youth group)	Attendance sheets; PCRC reports	0	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS ROL/L UNDP
<b>Outcome 4</b>							
Increased frequency of local government officials engaging communities in political, peace and security decision making.	Outcome	Increased number of engagements between local government officials and communities on matters related to political, peace, and security decision making.	UNMISS Reports	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS
Number of instances in which national & subnational institutions and structures engage youth and civil society organizations in governance, rule of law, peacebuilding and human rights and decision-making processes.	Output	Number of meetings/workshops supported by project in which local governance structures engage with youth, women, and civil society on matters related to governance, rule of law, human rights, and decision-making processes.	UNMISS/ UNDP reports	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS CAD, HRD / A2J
Number of government officials trained (disaggregated by portfolio and gender) for better management and provision of services.	Output	Number of local government officials participating in events/engagements supported under Outcome 4 of the project (disaggregated by portfolio and gender)	Attendance sheets; training reports	0	TBD	Quarterly	UNMISS CAD, HRD / A2J
5A. Percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Scores (FCS)	Outcome	This indicator will be linked to food security indicators that are directly resulting from livelihoods interventions	Bi-annual Post Distribution Monitoring	TBD	TBD	Bi-annual	WFP, TOCH

5B: Graduation rate of at-risk youth engaged in formal and informal education, disaggregated by gender and type of education.	Outcome	linked to peacebuilding activities This indicator will be linked to vocational training and technical livelihoods trainings	(PDM) survey Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
5d. Number of targeted individuals productively engaging in viable livelihoods as a result of the programme, disaggregated by gender and age	Outcome		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC5.2 RS4/RG 2.3 1: Number of women, men, boys and girls receiving capacity strengthening / training / technical support by type.	Output		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC5.3: Number of at-risk youth provided access to career development and employment/ livelihood opportunities.	Output		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
New: Number of small and large-scale farmers with improved market access, disaggregated by sex and age of participant	Output		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC 6.8: Number of events organised to facilitate linkages between market actors, producer groups and communities.	Output		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
New: Number of knowledge hubs, learning centres and crop and vegetable demonstration sites established for interaction of farmers from different communities, extension agents, and private sector players	Output		Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
<b>OUTCOME 6</b>							
6.A: HNO number of People in Need in targeted area (county level) in 'x' time period.	Outcome	This indicator will be further defined after the baseline as number of PIN in target area is not currently clear due to inaccessibility	PDM	TBD	TBD	Bi-Annual	WFP, TOCH
6B: Number of displaced individuals voluntarily returning/relocating to the target area3	Outcome	This indicator will be linked specifically to returns or displacements due to conflict dynamics addressed by this project	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH

(Disaggregated by sex, age)						
OC6.3: Number of people who actively participate in Community-based Participatory Planning exercises to identify structural drivers of recurrent crises.	Output	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC6.4: Number of events/activities/plans developed in a participatory manner on priority projects to address community-level violence	Output	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC6.5/RG 2.2.2: Number of community assets built, restored or maintained	Output	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC6.6: Number of individuals engaged in building restoration or maintaining community assets (e.g. community centre) through cash for work, (disaggregated by gender)	Output	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH
OC6.9: Number of disaster management strategies and plans developed and supported addressing competition over resources that drives conflict.	Output	Partner reporting and process monitoring	TBD	TBD	Quarterly	WFP, TOCH

## ANNEX C: WORKPLAN


Provide a month-by-month workplan indicating anticipated implementation start and completion of activities.

RSRTF OUTCOME # - OUTPUT ACTIVITIES	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
<b>INCEPTION PHASE</b> (Add additional rows below, if necessary)										
Recruitment										
Procurement										
Baseline Assessment										
<b>OUTCOME 1</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 1.1</b>										
Inception workshops										
Focus group discussions										
Pre-dialogues										
County-level dialogue										
Greater Tonj Dialogue										
Follow-up dialogues										
High-level meeting (Political elites Juba and Tonj base)										
Dissemination and radio talk shows										
Trauma healing sessions – dealing with the past										
<b>OUTPUT 1.2:</b>										
Participate in dialogues/events organized by reconciliation pillar										
Build capacity of local government structures/fora established through reconciliation pillar in Phase I										
Support effective engagement between national and local levels to effectively address local-level governance concerns										
<b>OUTCOME 2</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 2.1</b>										
Formation and training of peace committees										
Training of youth peace champions (Abiong de door)										
Workshops to strengthen women's role in peacebuilding										
Formation and training of peace monitoring committees										
Cultural festivals and sports for peace										
<b>OUTCOME 3</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 3.1:</b>										
Conduct assessment of community perceptions of justice										
Targeted trainings to increase informal judicial actors' capacity and knowledge of national frameworks and human rights standards, to effectively resolve disputes and to facilitate their understanding of limits on their authority and jurisdiction										
Support the establishment and operationalization of community paralegal networks										
Support establishment and/or strengthening of referral pathways between informal and formal authorities										

Support the review of the Wanhalel Law to align its provisions with international treaties, including human rights treaties, the Transitional Constitution and other laws of South Sudan										
<b>OUTPUT 3.2:</b>										
Conduct community consultations on developing an accountability mechanism to address past crimes arising from communal violence										
Support establishment and deployment of accountability mechanism(s) agreed by the community										
Targeted trainings to the formal justice chain to strengthen skills to effectively respond to conflict drivers and criminal patterns, such as murder, abduction and cattle raiding										
Targeted rule of law infrastructure development in key areas to sustain the presence of rule of law actors										
Support to community policing efforts, including through the establishment of Police Community Relations Committees										
<b>OUTCOME 4</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 4.1</b>										
Participate in dialogues/events organized by reconciliation pillar										
Build capacity of local government structures/fora established through reconciliation pillar in Phase I										
Support effective engagement between national and local levels to effectively address local-level governance concerns										
<b>OUTCOME 5</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 5.1</b>										
Entrepreneurship development for at risk youths										
Supporting and diversifying agro-pastoral livelihoods (on-farm interventions)										
Technical and vocational education and training (off-farm interventions)										
Skill building activities, trainings										
Diversifying horticulture production, semi processing and packaging										
<b>OUTPUT 5.2</b>										
Fodder production, processing, preservation and storage										
Processing of diversified animal products										
Improve natural regeneration of grass and tree species that support livestock										
<b>OUTPUT 5.3</b>										
Participatory extension approaches, including farmer field schools; lead farmer/farmer-to farmer approaches, innovation platforms, village-based demonstration sites, farmer market schools, and exposure and learning visits										
Farmer organisation and creation of producer groups/cooperatives to lead market linkages										

Trainings on approaches suitable for diverse capabilities and learning needs of farmer group members										
Creating knowledge hubs through aggregation centres, demonstration sites, and learning visits										
Creating productive value chains and functional markets, establishment Private Public Partnerships (PPP) in agriculture extension										
<b>OUTCOME 6</b>										
<b>OUTPUT 6.1</b>										
Form Community Planning Teams at the boma level and conduct Community Based Participatory Planning (CBPP).										
Development of Community Action Plan (CAP) and related asset creation activity plans, taking into consideration topography, recurrent shocks and stressors, labour capacity, and other contextual information.										
Provide support for asset creation activities based on Community Action Plan.										
Provide training to ensure durable assets are created to technical standards.										
Provide training on asset maintenance and utilization.										
Form and train project management committees (PMC) to support community level management of asset creation and support two-way feedback between project participants, community members, and partners.										

ANNEX D: MAP OF TARGET AREAS




### ANNEX E: DINKA LINEAGE SYSTEMS IN GREATER TONJ

Dinka society is roughly based on a hierarchy of patriarchal, lineage-based social units that may act corporately or independently depending on the situation. Historically, lower-level social units may set aside active conflicts between them to act together against a larger threat, such as multiple sub-sections coming together as their higher-level section to fight another section of the same ethnicity. When the larger threat has been reduced or eliminated at least temporarily, these clans may then resume the conflicts among themselves with which they were preoccupied before recognising the larger threat.

Level	Social Unit	Administrative Unit	Example
First	Ethnicity	State/county	Dinka
Second	Section	State/county	Rek
Third	Sub-Section	County/payam	Kuacthii
Fourth	Clan	Payam/boma	Noi


Across South Sudan, and especially after the enactment of the 2009 Land Act, many administrative units correspond with various social units, typically based on ethnic and sub-ethnic identity. The terminology for units of social organisation among these segmentary structures is not standardised, but the typology used in this proposal is seen in the table on the right. The below offers a rough overview of sub-ethnic breakdown in Tonj.

Tonj South:





Tonj North:



Tonj East:

ANNEX F: ORGANIGRAM COORDINATION MECHANISMS

